Cited by

¶ 14 (App. 2001) (“[W]e do not begin our statutory analysis by examining the general ‘purpose’ of a statute and then determining whether public policy concerns support application of the statute in particular factual circumstances.

Ctr., (discussing mental health and medical providers’ mandatory duty to report); Waters v. O’Connor, n.8 (App. 2004) (footnote discussing scope of clergy duty to disclose); ¶¶ 9-17 (App. 2002) (addressing marital privilege in prosecution for abuse); n.1 (App. 2001) (discussing statutory exceptions to physician-patient privilege); ¶¶ 16-17 (App. 1999) (whether duty to report under statute makes physician an agent of the state); (noting psychologist had duty to report evaluati

See Waters, 209 Ariz. at 384 ¶ 16 (noting the narrow construction for the clergy-penitent privilege); ¶ 5 (App. 2001) (noting the narrow construction for the physician-patient privilege).

See Zumar Indus., (“When a statutory scheme expressly defines certain terms, we are bound by those definitions in construing a statute within that scheme.” ()).

¶20 But the physician-patient privilege is not absolute, and the legislature has imposed limitations when “the public good requires [the privilege to] give way to serve a greater good.” ¶ 96 (App. 1999); –95 ¶ 11 (App. 2001).

¶ 4 (App. 2001); ¶ 12 (App. 2002) (reviewing de novo a statutory exception to a privilege).

“When a statutory scheme expressly defines certain terms, we are bound by those definitions in construing a statute within that scheme.” ¶ 20 (App. 2001).

by asserting a particular factual position and then invoking the privilege not only to buttress such a position but also to prevent the opposing party from impeaching or otherwise challenging it.” ¶ 16, (internal quotes and citations omitted).

Implied waiver prevents a party from “asserting a particular factual position and then invoking the privilege” not only to support that position, but also to “prevent the opposing party from impeaching or otherwise challenging it.” ¶ 16

7 STATE v. SIMMONS Decision of the Court ¶15 We are thus bound by these definitions when interpreting the language of § 13-3417(A), including the meaning of “facilitate” and “conspire.” See Hazlett, 73 P.3d at 1266; (“When a statutory scheme expressly defines certain terms, we are bound by those definitions in construing a statute within that scheme.”).

(“The [attorney- client] privilege may not be used as both a sword and a shield.”) (); ¶ 16 (App. 2001) (noting a party may not “assert[] a particular factual position and then invok[e a] privilege” that allows him “not only to 7 BURCH v. HON.

¶ 5, (noting that a major purpose behind the Arizona Legislature’s enactments furthering patient privacy and extending testimonial privileges to written medical records is to “encourag[e] full and frank disclosure of medical history and symptoms by a patient to his doctor”).

(stating that statute abrogates physician-patient privilege in cases involving abuse of a child); -95, ¶ 11 , -66 (App. 2001) (stating that physician-patient privilege is not absolute as legislature has created exceptions).

(distinguishing Benton; holding that physician-patient privilege barred disclosure of records of criminal defendant accused of worker’s compensation fraud).

¶4 , (citing Home Indem.

“The question of whether a privilege exists is generally a legal question that is subject to our de novo review.”

¶ 24, (rejecting argument made at oral argument in part because it was not presented either in the trial court or in the appellate briefs) ( ).

Co., , 122 n. 1, ¶ 16, , 667 n. 1 (App.2001); ¶ 4 , (stating that we review the trial court’s interpretation and application of statutes de novo).