Cited by

–13, ¶ 38 (App. 2013); Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 107 (“The touchstone for determining whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact constitutes an ‘element’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offense.”).

§ 13-105(13) (defining “[d]angerous offense” to include “an offense involving the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument[.]”); ¶ 38 (App. 2013) (holding that “a jury need not make a finding of dangerousness where it is ‘inherent in the crime.’” (citation modified)).

P. 19.1(c)(1); (prohibiting “sentencing aggravator” from being referenced during guilt phase).

(When the court admits a criminal defendant’s prior offenses, it must inform the jury it is for the limited and restricted purpose of determining credibility as a witness and not to determine whether he is of bad character.); ¶ 37 (App. 2013) (“[C]ourts are not required to follow the 3 STATE v. ESPINOZA Decision of the Court RAJI.”); Ariz. R. Evid.

¶25 We are unpersuaded by McKinley’s ¶¶ 41–42 (App. 2013), in which this court held the superior court could not sentence the defendant under A.R.S.

¶21 We review alleged Confrontation Clause violations de novo, ¶ 14 (App. 2003), but apply fundamental, prejudicial error review when the issue of confrontation is raised for the first time on appeal, ¶ 14 (App. 2013).

A jury “need not make a finding of dangerousness where it is inherent in the crime,” ¶ 38 (App. 2013) (quotations omitted), and 5 STATE v. MENDOZA Decision of the Court dangerousness is inherent in a verdict for aggravated assault involving dangerous instruments.

¶ 42 (App. 2013), in which the jury actually rendered a decision inconsistent with an implicit dangerousness finding, is therefore misplaced.

¶ 41 (App. 2013) (explaining “a defendant could be convicted of armed robbery for using a simulated deadly weapon without that offense being dangerous”).

¶ 41 (App. 2013) (sentence enhancement may be inherent in the verdict).

§ 13-1507, which requires a person enter or remain “unlawfully in or on a residential structure with the intent to commit any theft or any felony therein.” Although first-degree burglary is not an inherently dangerous offense, ¶ 40 (App. 2013), it may become so if it “involv[es] the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument,” A.R.S.

–13 ¶¶ 38, 42 (App. 2013) (stating that even though a defendant’s armed robbery conviction was “inherently dangerous” because it involved possessing a deadly weapon during the course of a robbery, the jury could have found the dangerousness allegation not proven because it acquitted the defendant of the related po

–13, ¶¶ 36, 41 (App. 2013).

¶ 38 (App. 2013) (“[A] jury need not make a finding of dangerousness where it is ‘inherent in the crime.’”) ( ¶ 18 (App. 2004)); ¶ 27 (App. 2007) (concluding the DCAC finding was inherent in guilty verdict of “intention

P. 19.1(c)(2)(B); -13, ¶¶ 34-36, 38 (App. 2013).

However, a jury need not make a finding of dangerousness where it is ‘inherent in the crime.’” ¶ 38 (App. 2013) (citations omitted).

-13, ¶¶ 38, 41 (App. 2013).

¶ 1 (2018); ¶ 14 (App. 2013).

P., State v. Patterson , , and State v. Larin , , the state argued that "Arizona law supports the Dangerousness finding being made separately, and specifically after, the jury renders its verdict."

¶ 38 (App. 2013) (explaining the jury did not need to make a specific finding when the finding is “inherent in the crime”).

However, Aschenbrenner did not raise this issue until his motion for new trial, therefore this claim is subject only to fundamental error review.5 (stating objection on one ground does not preserve a different evidentiary theory presented for the first time on appeal); ¶ 14, (“By failing to timely raise an issue at trial, .

§ 13-105(13) (2015), -2904(A)(6) (2015); -13, ¶ 38 (App. 2013) (holding a jury need not make a finding of dangerousness where an element of the offense charged contains an allegation and requires proof of dangerousness) (citations omitted).

In deciding whether dangerousness is inherent in an offense, we "look to statutes defining [the] offense, the indictment, and 'whether "an element of the offense charged contains an allegation and requires proof" of dangerousness.'" ¶ 64 (App. 2015) ( ¶ 38 (App. 2013)).