Cited by

¶ 10 (App. 2014) (interpreting § 13-1501(12) as applying “[not to] all parts of a single structure” but to “two ‘separately securable’ structures that are attached”).

Because §§ 13-1701(2) and -1704 are unambiguous in context, this Court need not apply this “construction principle of last resort.” ¶ 13 (App. 2014).

¶8 Gorla argues T.B.’s filing cabinet is not a nonresidential structure because it was not “separately securable from any other structure attached to it.” However, “§ 13-1501(12) does not require that all parts of a single structure be ‘securable.’ Rather, the second requirement applies to “two ‘separately securable’ structures that are attached.” ¶ 10 (App. 2014).

State v. Bon , , ¶ 5, ; State v. Latham , , ¶ 9

See, ¶ 13 (App. 2014) (defining the rule of lenity as a “principle of last resort” where the court of appeals will “resolve ambiguity in favor of a defendant if the statutory language is unclear and other forms of statutory construction have failed to reveal the legislature’s intent”).

¶ 2, (quotations and citation omitted).

¶ 5, (denial of a Rule 20 motion reviewed de novo) (citations omitted).

¶¶ 9–10 (App. 2014) (“As it relates to a vehicle, the second requirement applies only to other structures that may be attached to the vehicle.”).

–54, ¶ 40 (2004); ¶ 5 (App. 2014).