Cited by

When the notice of appeal is “clearly premature” and thus a “nullity,” “the trial court does not lose jurisdiction of the case.” ¶ 11 (App. 2012).

¶ 16 (App. 2010) (rejecting appellant’s claim that time limits at trial violated his due process in part because he “did not request additional time”); ¶ 25 (App. 2012) (“Absent 6 ROBINSON v. ROBINSON Decision of the Court extraordinary circumstances, errors not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal because the court and opposing counsel should have the

Johnson and Gravino, ¶ 26 (App. 2012) (explaining that arguments that are not raised in an opening brief are generally waived).

¶11 First, Husband waived this argument by failing to address it in his opening brief, ¶ 26 (App. 2012), or cite evidence to support it, see J.W.

¶ 9 (App. 2024) (“[A]n appeal generally divests the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed except in furtherance of the appeal.”); ¶ 13 (App. 2012) (observing that once an appeal has commenced, jurisdiction does not revest in the trial court until our mandate issues).

See id.; ¶ 8 (App. 2012) (“[A] notice of appeal is premature if there are any unresolved claims when the notice is filed[,] and all premature notices of appeal are ineffective and a nullity.”).

This court has “an independent duty to determine [its] own jurisdiction, which is prescribed by statute,” and has “no authority to entertain an appeal over which [it does] not have jurisdiction.” ¶ 5 (App. 2012) (citations omitted).

¶ 6 (App. 2012) (citation omitted).

In general, a superior court is divested of jurisdiction upon the filing of a notice of appeal, but this rule “is not absolute” and there are many “well established exceptions.” ¶ 7 (App. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).

See Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 66, ¶ 11 (a decree is ambiguous if it "can reasonably be construed to have more than one meaning") ( ¶ 21 (App. 2005)); ¶¶ 16-17 (App. 2012).

¶ 9 (App. 2012); (appellate courts decide debatable issues of an order’s appealability).

A decree is ambiguous if it “can reasonably be construed to have more than one meaning.” ¶ 16 (App. 2012) ( ¶ 21 (App. 2005)).

See In re Marriage of Johnson and Gravino , , ¶ 5, , 505 (App. 2012).

¶ 26 (App. 2017) (finding claims waived when issues are not pursued before the trial court); ¶ 25 (App. 2012) (same).

See, , 341 ¶ 6, , In re Marriage of Johnson & Gravino, , 230 ¶ 5

See, ¶ 6 (2014); ¶ 5 (App. 2012).

¶ 16 (App. 2012) (“A decree is ambiguous only when [its language] can reasonably be construed to have more than one meaning.”) (citation omitted).

Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 66 ¶ 11; ¶ 16 (App. 2012) (“First, we must determine if the decree is ambiguous.”).

“We review the trial court’s interpretation of an existing decree of dissolution de novo.” ¶ 10, (citation omitted); ¶ 15