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The Sixth Amendment likewise places no obligation on the state “to secure testimony from a defense witness by replacing the protection of the self-incrimination privilege with a grant of use immunity.” -25 (1983) (quoting United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1980)).

(“Admission as a hearsay exception is not foreclosed by the fact that a statement’s reliability has been impugned.”).

This list is not exhaustive; prior bad act evidence is admissible “for any purpose other than that of showing the defendant’s criminal propensities.”

“The basis for the exception is that the event produces nervous excitement making fabrication unlikely.”

404(b) (“[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove” a defendant’s character “in order to show action in conformity therewith[,]” but such evidence may be admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”); (“The list of ‘other purposes’ in rule 404(b) .

Citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984), Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 n. 20 (1979) the superior court found Hernandez “ha[d] not established a Fourth Amendment violation because the jail hid recording devices in the 6 STATE

§ 13-4064, and “it is a matter for prosecutorial discretion to decide when the public interest would be best served by a grant of immunity.”

Cf. Saenz, 197 Ariz. at 490–91, ¶ 13 (explaining that knowledge of evidence precluded due diligence); (“[W]here a defendant knows of the existence and identity of a witness before trial and makes no effort to obtain the witness’ testimony, such testimony will not ordinarily justify a new trial.”).

it is reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment.” –21 (1983).

¶40 Finally, while Interval’s suspicions of infidelity occurred years before C.M.’s disappearance, “[t]he admissibility of such testimony is not measured by remoteness in time,” and instead, “the length of time is a factor to be considered by the jury in determining the weight of the evidence.” (citation omitted).

Evidence obtained in violation of this requirement may be subject to suppression, see Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 265 -69 , 689 P.2d at 524 -528 , but only the person whose rights were violated may claim the violation, see State v. Jeffers , , 413, ; State v. Juarez , , ¶ 12, (citing Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128 , 143, 99 S.Ct.

is admissible even though it refers to his [other] acts.” (citations omitted).

(explaining the relevance of evidence of “prior trouble between the victim and the accused”).

Rule 404(b)’s list of other purposes is not exhaustive; “if evidence is relevant for any purpose other than that of showing the defendant’s criminal propensities, it is admissible even though it refers to his prior bad acts.” (citations omitted); accord Scott, 243 Ariz. at 187, ¶ 14 (citation omitted).

(stating we will affirm a trial court’s Rule 404(b) rulings when “supported by the facts before the court”); ¶ 77 (2017) (“Before admitting [Rule 404(b)] evidence, the court must find (1) clear and convincing proof that the defendant committed the act; (2)

(holding evidence of escape from jail was relevant to show consciousness of guilt, even though there may have been other explanations for the attempted escape).

that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); (“The application of the fourth amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, reasonable, legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by the challenged government action.”).

-47, ¶ 8 (1998) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976), ).

This Court has “long held that where the existence of premeditation is in issue, evidence of previous quarrels or difficulties between the accused and the victim is admissible.” ( P. 947 (1915)).