Cited by

(“[L]ack of knowledge that one’s conduct violated the law is no defense to criminal liability.”); ¶ 15 (N.M.

(“A criminal defendant does not have a right to a plea agreement.”); –32 (1980) (“Far from being available upon a defendant’s demand, a plea bargain can be obtained only by agreement among the defendant, his counsel and the prosecuting attorney, subject to the approval of the trial court.”).

(noting that theft by controlling stolen property does not require specific intent, and reiterating that “ignorance, or lack of knowledge, of the law which forbids the conduct with which one is charged is no defense”).

5 STATE v. ORNER Decision of the Court ¶18 In determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda, the court considers all the circumstances of the interrogation to determine whether a reasonable person would have felt deprived of his or her freedom “in a significant way.”

(excluding general, on- the-scene questioning during a criminal investigation from the definition of custodial interrogation).

-32 (1980) (stating that a plea agreement can be revoked by any party at any time prior to its acceptance by the court); Ariz. R. Crim.

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977)

(excluding general, on-the-scene questioning during a criminal investigation from the definition of custodial interrogation).

Because defendants have no constitutional right to plea bargains and the executive has the prerogative of deciding whether to offer a plea, -32, -48 (1980), the State contends that Rule 15.8 improperly infringes on executive powers by authorizing the preclusion of evidence if the prosecutor declines to reinstate a plea offer.

See State v. *268 Morse, , (“The elimination of language concerning intent from Arizona’s statute prohibiting receipt of stolen property indicates that the Legislature intended to remove that element from the offense.”); ¶23 , (“The ‘decision to de

To support this contention, defendants cite Allen v. Yukins, 366 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2004), and State v. Simms, 518 A.2d 35 (Conn. 1986), both criminal cases in which the defendants were charged with constructive knowledge of court decisions.7 (ignorance of the law forbidding charged conduct is no defense).

a core prosecutorial power [and] a matter committed to the sound discretion of the prosecution, an executive branch agency.” 198 Ariz. at 418, ¶ 48 , 10 P.3d at 1205 (internal quotations and citation omitted); , (“Our country’s legal system vests broad discretion in prosecuting attorneys.

P.2d 749 (1988); see also 8 Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2 d 1287 (5 th Cir. 199 3) (prosecu tor has discre tion to plea bargain with some defe ndants and not with others); P.2d 1141 (1980) (decision to te rminate plea negotiations lies with prosec utor’s office, not trial judge); cf. Secord.

(“A deei *463 sion within a prosecutor’s office to cut off plea bargaining at the time trial begins follows logically from one of the reasons for engaging in plea bargaining: judicial economy through the avoidance of trials.”) (emphasis added).

The most important of all these is the assumption that all persons of sound and mature mind are presumed to know the law.” , 140 P. 496, 500 (1914) (citation and internal quotation omitted); , (“It is generally accepted that ignorance, or lack of knowledge, of the law which forbids the conduct with which one is charged is no defense.”).

(rejecting contention that existence of probable cause to arrest requires administration of Miranda warnings and deciding that custody is crucial issue in determining necessity of warnings).