Cited by

Also, “[i]t is not a legitimate function of voir dire to condition the jury to the receipt of certain evidence or to a particular view of the evidence.”

See, (error in refusing to consider mitigating circumstance not listed in sentencing statute).

(“An appellate court will not find error on the ground that the defendant was shackled unless it is shown that the jury saw the shackles.”).

¶11 The questions were not designed—as Nichols argues—“to condition the jury to the receipt of certain evidence or to a particular view of the evidence.”

For parties to “intelligently exercise these rights of challenge, they are privileged to examine prospective jurors as to their qualifications.” -42

¶12 Harris contends the prosecutor’s statements improperly conditioned the jury and amounted to structural error.4 (“It is not a legitimate function of voir dire to condition the jury to the receipt of certain evidence or to a particular view of the evidence.”).

(“An appellate court will not find error on the ground that the defendant was shackled unless it is shown that the jury saw the shackles.”); ¶ 8, (to warrant mistrial, appellant 1 Brown does not challenge the use

See Rule 15.5(a) comment (“The court is given broad discretion to limit discovery required by this rule whenever it is shown a risk of harm resulting from a specific disclosure.”); –97, –41 (1983) (trial judge has broad discretion to regulate discovery under Rule 15.5).

See, (noting that the “preferred procedure” is for the prosecutor to obtain a court order under Rule 15.5(c) before redacting information, but recognizing trial courts’ power to approve redactions subsequently).

Although “personality or character disorders usually are not sufficient to satisfy this statutory mitigator,” 437 ¶ 49, we nonetheless consider evidence of a personality disorder to determine if it constitutes a non-statutory mitigating circumstance, State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 102

The trial court must ask prospective jurors questions “it deems necessary to determine their qualifications,” , and that will “unveil a juror’s prejudices.”

¶ 32 We reject Clabourne’s contention that the resentencing court violated , -18 , -14 (1994), by not explicitly stating that it had considered Clabourne’s mental capacity evidence for nonstatutory effect after rejecting the statutory claim.

There was no jury present during sentencing, , (finding no error because jury did not see the shackles), and nothing indicates that the restraints detracted from defendant’s concentration while testifying.

1058 , 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993)