Cited by

§ 13–114; nor “to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.” Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186, ¶ 28.

(Constitutional waiver is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (cleaned up)).

ng: (1) “whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between counsel and the accused, and whether new counsel would be confronted with the same conflict;” (2) “the timing of the motion;” (3) “inconvenience to witnesses;” (4) “the time period already elapsed between the alleged offense and trial;” (5) “the proclivity of the defendant to change counsel” and (6) “quality of counsel.” – 87 (1987) (citing cases).

This right is to competent counsel, but not to any particular counsel, nor to a meaningful relationship with the attorney, Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186 ¶ 28.

(“A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by evidence.”).

See, ¶ 7 (2004) (discussing the superior court’s duty to inquire about “the basis of a defendant’s request for substitution of counsel”) (emphasis added); -87 (1987) (discussing the factors the superior court should consider when ruling on a motion for change of counsel).

VI; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24

“A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by evidence.”

–87 (1987) (stating that the court should consider “whether new counsel would be confronted with the same conflict; the timing of the motion; inconvenience to witnesses; the time period already elapsed between the alleged offense and trial; the proclivity of the defendant to change counsel; and quality of counsel”

¶14 Trial courts should examine requests for new counsel “with the rights and interest of the defendant in mind tempered by exigencies of judicial economy.”

at 187, ¶ 31 (-87 (1987), ¶ 11 (1998)).

new counsel would be confronted with the same conflict; the timing of the motion; inconvenience to witnesses; the time period already 4 STATE v. MEDINA-MARTINEZ Decision of the Court elapsed between the alleged offense and trial; the proclivity of the defendant to change counsel; and quality of counsel.” -87 (1987); ¶ 11 (1998).

ANALYSIS Scalph argues the trial court erred in summarily denying his request for new counsel without conducting a

(among factors relevant to motion for change of counsel are "whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between counsel and the accused, and whether new counsel would be confronted with the same conflict").

Moreover, the fact that prejudice is an element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, does not mean trial courts 1 One of Portillo’s court-appointed lawyers had represented him since his March 2014 arraignment, and her co-counsel, also appointed by the court, had been working on the case for approximately six months.

Although this right includes the right to competent counsel, a defendant is not entitled to “counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney,” Torres, 208 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 6, 93 P.3d at 1058 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

-87 (1987) (factors relevant to request for new counsel include "whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between counsel and the accused, and whether new counsel would be confronted with the same conflict .