Cited by

403; (testimony is not unfairly prejudicial just because it may “harm defendant’s interests”).

¶20 Cochran argues that expert testimony is only permissible to explain “curious or puzzling victim behavior,” and because Owen’s behavior was not “puzzling,” the jury did not need “expert enlightenment” on the facts here

The admissibility of expert testimony is generally a fact-bound inquiry that focuses on whether the proffered expert has sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, or education to “provide the jurors with useful information outside their common understanding or experience.” see also Ariz. R. Evid.

“Such opinions are rejected[,]” this Court reasoned, “because they are ‘nothing more than advice to jurors on how to decide the case.’” Reimer, 189 Ariz. at 241 (); (“[E]xperts should not be allowed to give their opinion of the accuracy, reliability or credibility of a particular witness in the case being tried [because] .

To be admissible, “expert testimony must (1) come from a qualified expert, (2) be reliable, (3) aid the triers of fact in evaluating and understanding matters not within their common experience, and (4) have probative value that outweighs its prejudicial effect.” –81 (1986).

“[J]ust because expert testimony about behavioral characteristics is exceedingly persuasive does not mean it is unfairly prejudicial.”

See, ¶ 6 (App. 2004) (stating “we do not weigh the evidence”); - 83 (1986) (credibility determinations are the jury’s prerogative); (“The weight of all testimony was for the jury.”).

See State v. Lindsey , , 475, , 76 (1986) ("[W]e explicitly state at this time that trial courts should not admit direct expert testimony that quantifies the probabilities of the credibility of another witness.") (citing State v. Buell , 22 Ohio St.3d 124 , 489 N.E.2d 795 , 804 (1986) ); State v. Moran , , 385-86, , 255-56 (1986) (collecting cases).

State v. Linares, 241 2 STATE v. COVEY Decision of the Court Ariz. 416, 418, ¶ 6 (App. 2017); (appellate court need not “honor a purported exercise of discretion which was infected by an error of law”) (quoting Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983)).

“Deciding whether expert testimony will aid the jury and balancing the usefulness of expert testimony against the danger of unfair prejudice are generally fact-bound inquiries uniquely within the competence of the trial court.”

¶14 We generally review a trial court’s admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 13 (2014), recognizing the trial court is in the best position to weigh “the usefulness of expert testimony against the danger of unfair prejudice” when addressing “fact-bound inquiries,”

Psychologists and psychiatrists are not, and do not claim to be, experts at discerning truth.” –74 (1986) (distinguishing between permissible expert testimony about general behavioral characteristics of child molestation victims and impermissible opinion testimony about an alleged victim’s credibility); (“A

“Deciding whether expert testimony will aid the jury and balancing the usefulness of expert testimony against the danger of unfair prejudice are generally fact-bound inquiries uniquely within the competence of the trial court.”

“Arizona prohibits lay and expert testimony concerning the veracity of a statement by another witness” because it is the province of the jury to determine veracity and credibility, “and opinions about witness credibility are ‘nothing more than advice to jurors on how to decide the case.’” ( ).

¶8 Even if the detective’s testimony is viewed as expert testimony, “[t]estimony describing behavioral characteristics or conduct outside jurors’ common experience is permitted.”

-41, -14 (App. 1997); -51, -80 (App. 1990).