Cited by

The court retained the inherent authority to modify the non- final judgment, and Rich cites nothing to the contrary.

(a superior court lacks jurisdiction to rule on an untimely post-judgment motion); Egan-Ryan Mech.

¶29 Grasshopper moved to reconsider in this court, because there, our supreme court held that even after a judgment becomes final, a party may “challenge a judgment on the ground that it is void for lack of jurisdiction of the parties.” Id.

P. 4.1(l)(1)(C); see also Omega II Inv.

relied upon to allow service by publication.” ¶27 In the case of service by publication, we have stated that the serving party’s “diligence as a fact is prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court.”

Sprang v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., (–23 (1963) ).

(noting the superior court's "inherent power" to modify judgments until they are final).

See Preston v. Denkins , , 222, (serving party must show jurisdictional fact that residence is unknown, not merely allege the residence is unknown to the plaintiff) (citing Lown v. Miranda , , 36-37, 267 P. 418 (1928) ).

See Wells v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., (stating that “the mere lapse of time is no bar to an attack on a void judgment”); (observing that the “right to challenge a judgment on the ground that it is void for lack of jurisdiction .

(“[T]he inherent power of the court to vacate or modify its judgment does not extend beyond the point at which the judgment becomes final, except as authorized by law.”).

uld not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 83(D); 4 JONES v. JONES Decision of the Court the court to vacate or modify its judgment does not extend beyond the point at which the judgment becomes final, except as authorized by law.” (noting that the power of a court to vacate or modify a judgment is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure).

(citations omitted).4 ¶10 Here, the November 20 signed order was a final, appealable order that resolved all outstanding issues related to the cross-petitions, including both parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees.

(due diligence in determining allegedly unknown residence of defendant as a fact is prerequisite to the jurisdiction of court to enter a default judgment upon service by publication); Omega II Inv.

-23 , -92 (1963)(court lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment following service by publication based on alleged lack of knowledge of defendants’ residences when simple inquiry would have revealed information); Master Fin., ¶15 , (App.20

The rules of civil procedure “have the force and effect of statute so far as applicable to any case.” , 219 n. 2, , 689 n. 2 (1963).

(no discretion to refuse relief from void default judgment).