Cited by

¶ 13 (2002); (the “[a]ppearance of interest 11 STATE v. ENGLISH Decision of the Court or prejudice is more than the speculation suggested by the defendant”).

¶ 12 (2002); ¶ 6 (2013).

Despite these waivers, we may elect to review the merits of Maxfield’s appeal, ¶ 12 (2002), and we do.

¶14 This Court articulated the standard to apply when deciding 4 CONTRERAS V. BOURKE Opinion of the Court whether a judge’s ¶ 16 (2002): If a situation is not one of those outlined in [CJCR 2.11(A)], but nonetheless implicates impartiality, a judge should consider “[w]hether an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which .

¶ 12 (2002) (exercising discretion to address waived arguments); (stating waiver is discretionary where minor children are involved); ¶ 18 (2003) (“We have repeatedly stressed that the child's best interest is paramount in custod

¶ 12 (2002) (exercising discretion to address waived arguments); (declining to find arguments waived where interests of minor children were involved); ¶ 18 (2003) (“We have repeatedly stressed that the child’s best interest is pa

¶ 12 (2002) (exercising discretion to address waived issues).

¶ 12 (2002) (doctrine of waiver is discretionary); ¶ 17 n.4 (App. 2008) (same); –66, ¶ 20 (2014) (conducting harmless-error review despite State’s failure to argue error was harmless in brief).

Moreover, the Court has previously rejected arguments that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily and irrationally in Arizona in violation of article 2, section 4, see, e.g., State v. 11 ¶ 36, and Hidalgo has not explained how Arizona’s prohibition on cruel and usual punishment should afford any protections different than the Eighth Amendment in this context.

55, 568 n.8, ¶ 47 (App. 2009) (“‘If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose 3 STATE v. MALIN Decision of the Court of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.’”) (internal citations omitted); ¶ 12 (2002) (appellate court may address argument otherwise waived).

¶ 13, (a trial judge is presumed to be impartial).

t if she did not do at least 23% better against [Edgerton] as well as against [Pjlaintiff.” Although Fisher did not present this argument to the superior court, and we normally consider unpreserved arguments waived, McDowell Mountain Ranch, 190 Ariz. at 5 , 945 P.2d at 316, given the constitutional issues involved, we exercise our discretion to address the issue on the merits, ¶ 12

See, (failure to make legal argument in trial court does not bar appellate court from addressing merits in its discretion).

("[W]aiver is a procedural concept that courts do not rigidly employ in mechanical fashion.”); , (appellate court may address argument otherwise waived); n. 8 , , 1145 n. 8 (App.2009) ('“If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for

gidly employ in mechanical fashion.”); n. 8 , , 1145 n. 8 (App.2009) (“ ‘If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.’ ”), , , (appellate court may address argument otherwise waived); n. 4 , , 687 n. 4 (App.2008) (exercising discretion to address issues first raised in reply brief).

¶37 “Judges are presumed to be impartial, and the party moving for change of judge must prove a judge’s bias or prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence.” ¶ 13, (finding capital murder defendant, who failed to provide evidence of actual bias, did not meet his burden of proof under Rule 10.1).

(reviewing court may choose to address argument otherwise waived).

(reviewing court may choose to address argument otherwise waived).