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“‘[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.’” ¶ 37 (2003) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).

“Because a trial judge has the best opportunity to assess whether a juror can be fair and impartial, appellate courts review [decisions on striking jurors] only for abuse of discretion.” (reaffirming abuse of discretion standard of review after elimination of peremptory strikes and confirming trial court’s exclusive “duty and authority to assess and address juror bias”).

“Because a trial judge has the best opportunity to assess whether a juror can be fair and impartial, appellate courts review such decisions only for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 39 (2003) (citing cases); ¶ 2 (App. 2023) (reaffirming abuse of discretion standard on appeal after elimination of peremptory strikes).

¶18 We have recognized that stare decisis “should not require [unbending] adherence to authority.” Derendal, 209 Ariz. at 424 ¶ 33 (); ¶ 37 (2003) (“Stare decisis is a doctrine of persuasion, not a rigid requirement .

¶ 31 (2003) (“[W]hen a defendant secures an impartial jury, even through the curative use of a peremptory challenge, a conviction by that jury will not have prejudiced that defendant.”).

However, stare decisis is “a doctrine of persuasion and not an iron chain of necessary conclusion,” (quoting O’), and “[t]he ease with which courts have abandoned precedent corresponds to the subject matter of the case at issue,” ¶ 38 (2003).

We will not depart from precedent absent special justification to do so, which requires “more than that a prior case was wrongly decided.” ¶ 37 (2003).

¶24 “Respect for precedent demands that we not lightly overrule precedent and we do so only for compelling reasons.” ¶ 37 (2003) (internal quotation omitted).

See Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 307-17; 196-97, 201, ¶¶ 6, 21, 39-40 (2003) ().

-01, ¶¶ 37-38 (2003) (discussing factors our supreme court considers when overruling precedent).

Indeed, ¶ 28 (2003), our supreme court concluded that the curative use of a peremptory strike was subject to harmless error review.

Using a peremptory challenge even when curing “a trial court’s error in denying a challenge for cause, without more, does not violate the constitutional right to an impartial jury.” ¶ 11 (2003).

our supreme court held that even if a court erroneously fails to remove a juror for cause, reversal is not warranted unless the party claiming error shows prejudice beyond the mere fact that the party had to use a peremptory challenge to remove that juror.

As our own supreme court has said, “there is no principled basis for interpreting a court rule governing peremptory challenges more broadly than a federal constitutional right.”

see also Henderson, , 115 P.3d at 607 (“Harmless error review places the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.”).

“Reversal is not required if a fair and impartial jury was ultimately empaneled.” Garza, 216 Ariz. at 63, 65, ¶¶ 20, 32 ( ¶ 22 (2003)).

¶¶ 37-38, -27 (2003) (explaining respect for precedent requires court not overrule precedent absent compelling reasons, and deference to precedent strongest when prior decision construes statute).

¶ 28, (finding curative use of peremptory challenge subject to harmless error review).

¶ 37 , (“Respect for precedent demands ‘that we not lightly overrule precedent and we do so only for compelling reasons.’”).

“Respect for precedent demands ‘that we not lightly overrule precedent and we do so only for compelling reasons.’” quoting Lowing v. Allstate Ins.