Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Hickman, 68 P.3d 418.

108 citing documents.

James C. Sell v. Hon. gama/squire & Company 295 P.3d 421 Ariz. 2013
James C. Sell v. Hon. gama/squire & Company 295 P.3d 421 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington 266 P.3d 1057 Ariz. 2011
State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington 266 P.3d 1057 Ariz. 2011
at 79 ¶ 19, 244 P.3d at 83 ( ¶ 31, ).
State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State v. Lynch 234 P.3d 595 Ariz. 2010
State v. Lynch 234 P.3d 595 Ariz. 2010
“Because a trial judge has the best opportunity to assess whether a juror can be fair and impartial, appellate courts review such decisions only for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 39, see also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 22 (2007) (requiring appellate “deference 8 to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror”).
State v. KUHS 224 P.3d 192 Ariz. 2010
State v. KUHS 224 P.3d 192 Ariz. 2010
¶27 ¶¶ 39, 41, this Court held that when defense counsel peremptorily strikes a juror, we will not find reversible error based on the trial court’s refusal to remove that juror for cause unless the resulting jury was not fair and impartial.
State v. Freeney 219 P.3d 1039 Ariz. 2009
State v. Freeney 219 P.3d 1039 Ariz. 2009
¶ 28, (“most trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error”).
State v. Escobedo 213 P.3d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Escobedo 213 P.3d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
199 n. 7, ¶ 29, , 425 n. 7 (2003).
State v. Speer 212 P.3d 787 Ariz. 2009
State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
State v. Speer 212 P.3d 787 Ariz. 2009
(-97 ¶¶ 20-21, -23 (2003)).
State v. Freeney 207 P.3d 688 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State of Arizona v. Steven Dwayne Szpyrka Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State of Arizona v. Steven Dwayne Szpyrka Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
-25 (2003) (acknowledging use of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda subject to harmless error analysis).
State of Arizona v. Sergio Alonzo Rubio Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State of Arizona v. Sergio Alonzo Rubio Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
¶5 P.3d 418 (2003), the state contends that Rubio waived this argument by failing to use a peremptory strike to remove the juror.
Town of Gilbert Prosecutor's Office v. Downie 189 P.3d 393 Ariz. 2008
Town of Gilbert Prosecutor's Office v. Downie 189 P.3d 393 Ariz. 2008
“While the phrase ‘special justification’ defies simple definition, it does require more than that a prior case was wrongly decided.” ¶ 37, (Ryan, J.).
State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
- 47, ¶ 41, -07 (2005); -01, ¶¶ 34-36, 40-41, -27 (2003).
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
-97, ¶¶ 20-21, -23 (2003).
State v. Le Noble 164 P.3d 686 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Le Noble 164 P.3d 686 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Garza 163 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2007
State v. Garza 163 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2007
State of Arizona v. Jill Irene Paris-Sheldon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Jill Irene Paris-Sheldon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
(defendant must show prejudice when trial court erroneously fails to excuse juror for cause and defendant uses peremptory challenge to cure error).
Turley v. Ethington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Turley v. Ethington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984).
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Rayes 141 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Rayes 141 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Although departure from stare decisis requires "special justification,” ¶ 37 , it is not "an inexorable command; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.'” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 , 111 S.Ct.
State v. McGill 140 P.3d 930 Ariz. 2006
State v. McGill 140 P.3d 930 Ariz. 2006
7 We will overturn long-standing precedent only for a compelling reason, , 200 ¶ 37, and McGill has not presented a compelling reason to do so here.
Hancock v. Bisnar 132 P.3d 283 Ariz. 2006
Hancock v. Bisnar 132 P.3d 283 Ariz. 2006
The strength of that doctrine is at its apex “when prior decisions construe a statute.” Galloway, 204 Ariz. at 256 ¶ 16, 69 P.3d at 27; ¶ 38, (noting that “in cases involving statutory interpretation the burden [required to overrule a prior decision] is highest”).
Monica C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 118 P.3d 37 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Monica C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 118 P.3d 37 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
199 n. 7, ¶ 29, , 425 n. 7 (2003) (“[Sjtructural errors require automatic reversal.”).
State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
- 99, 201, ¶¶ 29, 41, -25, 427 (2003) (holding that a court’s error in failing to strike potential jurors for cause was subject to harmless error review because even though the defendant had to exercise peremptory challenges on those potential jurors, he did not use all
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
State v. Henderson 100 P.3d 911 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004