Cited by

A party is entitled to a jury instruction on any theory the evidence reasonably supports, ¶ 197 (2004), but a court does not err by refusing to give a jury instruction that “does not fit the facts of the particular case, or is adequately covered by the other instructions,” (“A trial court is not require

Furthermore, “the trial judge’s invitation to counsel to ask follow-up questions mitigates any deficiency in the court’s questioning.” State v. Moody (“Moody II”), ¶ 98 (2004).

¶ 101 n. 9 (2004) (“In Arizona, opening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an appellant’s position on the issues raised.”) (); ¶ 8 (App. 2001) (issue waived because defendant fail

v. Neal, but review constitutional issues de novo, ¶ 62 (2004).

¶ 101, n.9 (2004) ("[O]pening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an appellant's position on the issues raised.

¶ 101, n.9 (2004) (failure to adequately argue claim in opening brief usually constitutes waiver).

¶23 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that ‘(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.’” ¶ 145 (2004) (citation omitted).

“Merely mentioning an argument is not enough.” ¶ 101 n.9 (2004).

¶ 101 n.9 (2004) (“Merely mentioning an argument is not enough[.]”).

¶ 14 (App. 2014) (citing cases); ¶ 81 (2004) (“Although the trial court’s [ruling] included no specific findings, we presume that the court was aware of the relevant law and applied it correctly in arriving at its ruling[.]”).

¶ 31 (2004); (“With one exception, review of matters relevant only to the grand jury proceedings cannot be sought by appeal from a conviction.”); ¶5 (App. 2018) (“[S]pecial action is a criminal defendant’s only avenue for revie

State v. Moody , , 437 ¶ 18, , 1122 (2004).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion, ¶ 37 (2003), but review purely legal issues and constitutional issues de novo, State v. Moody (Moody II), ¶ 62 (2004).

¶ 114 (2004); ¶ 22 (App. 1999)

¶ 50 (2007) (declining to consider an alleged error in the admission of evidence where the defendant “explicitly stated that he did not” object to its admissibility) ( ¶ 111 (2004)).

¶15 To secure reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show the prosecutor’s actions were improper and “a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 145 (2004).

¶29 Although "[a]ttorneys, including prosecutors in criminal cases, are given wide latitude in their closing arguments," State v. Moody , , ¶ 154, (quoting State v. Comer , , 426, , 346 (1990) ), there are limitations.

¶ 3, n.1 (App. 2010) (finding waiver 3 SHORES v. DIAZ Decision of the Court of arguments that were raised in a reply brief but not advanced in the opening brief); ¶ 101, n.9 (2004) ("In Arizona, opening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an appellant's position on the issues raised.

See State v. Moody , , n.9, , 1147 (2004) (Appellant "must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth [the] appellant's position on the issues raised.