Cited by

..” It is an error for a court to allow a party to “make arguments which appeal to the passions and fears of the jury.” ¶ 149 (2004).

¶ 101 n.9 (2004) (declining to address issue that appellant “mentioned” in his opening brief because he “made no argument regarding it”; “Merely mentioning an argument is not enough.”).

¶ 12 (2010) (stating that “a conviction precludes review of the finding of probable cause made by a grand jury” ( n.3 ¶ 31 (2004))); A.R.S.

But “[c]ounsel is given ‘wide latitude’ in closing argument to ‘comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences’ from it.” ¶ 180 (2004) ().

–40 ¶ 31 (2004) (limiting direct appeal review of grand jury procedure to when a “defendant has had to stand trial on an indictment which the government knew was based partially on perjured, material testimony”).

¶ 31 (2004) (“[O]n appeal we will review the indictment only to determine whether it was based on perjured, material testimony.”).

¶ 101 n.9 (2004) (failure to develop argument generally results in abandonment and waiver of issue).

¶ 132 (2004) (an error is harmless when the error could not affect the jury’s verdict).

§ 13-4501(3); ¶ 56 (2004).

See Dickinson, (defendant may not rely upon speculation to establish prejudice); (counsel given wide latitude to comment on evidence and argue reasonable inferences in closing argument).

¶ 114 (2004) (citing cases)

¶ 27 (2006) ( ¶ 62 (2004)).

See Humana, 154 Ariz. at 5 LOPEZ v. STATE Opinion of the Court 403 (quotation omitted); ¶ 129 (2004) (The State may not unreasonably interfere with a defendant’s request for a scientific test.); (“Unless a party to an action can make claim to some personal right or privilege in respect to the subject matter of a subpoena duces tecum directed to a no

¶ 145 (2004); –70, 5 STATE v. TAFOYA Decision of the Court ¶¶ 46–47 (2020) (defining and distinguishing between prosecutorial error and prosecutorial misconduct).

Co. of Ariz., ¶ 18 (App. 2007) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time on appeal are untimely and deemed waived.”); ¶ 25 (App. 2017) (“In the absence of the transcript, we presume it supports the court’s ruling.”); n. 9, ¶ 101 (2004) (failure to develop argument usually results in abandonment and waiver of issue).

P. 31.10(a)(7); ¶ 101 n. 9 (2004).

¶9 “Whether to impose a sanction for late disclosure and which sanction to impose are discretionary decisions left to the trial court; we will not disturb those decisions absent an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 114 (2004); (“Denial of a [disclosure] sanction is generally not an abuse of discretion if the trial court believes the defendant will not be prejudiced.”).

¶ 101 n. 9 (2004) (“Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.” (quotation omitted)); -96, ¶¶ 57-58 (2022) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to trial court’s decision to strike certain prospective jurors because defendant did not “ar

¶ 79 (2004) (citing cases; “[O]ur case law on evidentiary privilege .

3 SL Fam., LLC v. State, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶ 12, (discussing standard of review for interpreting statutes); ¶ 62 (2004) (discussing standard of review for purely legal issues).

The court reviews “constitutional issues and purely legal issues de novo.” ¶ 62 (2004).