Cited by

¶9 “Whether to impose a sanction for late disclosure and which sanction to impose are discretionary decisions left to the trial court; we will not disturb those decisions absent an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 114 (2004); (“Denial of a [disclosure] sanction is generally not an abuse of discretion if the trial court believes the defendant will not be prejudiced.”).

¶ 101 n. 9 (2004) (“Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.” (quotation omitted)); -96, ¶¶ 57-58 (2022) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to trial court’s decision to strike certain prospective jurors because defendant did not “ar

¶ 79 (2004) (citing cases; “[O]ur case law on evidentiary privilege .

3 SL Fam., LLC v. State, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶ 12, (discussing standard of review for interpreting statutes); ¶ 62 (2004) (discussing standard of review for purely legal issues).

The court reviews “constitutional issues and purely legal issues de novo.” ¶ 62 (2004).

-40, ¶ 31 (2004) (Grand-jury proceedings preceding a conviction may be challenged on direct appeal only if the State knew the indictment was based on perjured, material testimony.).

“To succeed on a claim that the court failed to adequately question the jury panel,” Schalk “must demonstrate not only that the voir dire examination was inadequate, but also that, as a result of the inadequate questioning, the jury selected was not fair, unbiased, and impartial.” ¶ 95 (2004).

Here, a petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for raising an interlocutory double jeopardy claim “[b]ecause the Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees the right to be free from subsequent prosecution” and, if applicable, “the clause is violated by the mere commencement of retrial.” ¶ 22 (2004)

In this context, and as Diaz asserted at trial, his defense was based on involuntary acts, which are "'knee-jerk reflex[es] driven by the autonomic nervous system'" like "'bodily movement[s] while unconscious, asleep, under hypnosis, or during an epileptic fit.'" ¶ 199 (2004) ().

P. 31.10(a)(7)(A); ¶ 101, n.9 (2004) (An appellant’s failure to support their position on an issue in their opening brief with developed arguments and legal authority usually constitutes waiver of that claim.).

¶¶ 151–52 (2004) (concluding a statement did not require reversal where it “was promptly objected to, and was rendered less harmful by instructions by the court”); ¶ 40 (2010) (stating that this Court presumes “that jurors follow the court’s instructions”).

¶ 121 (2004) (“Thus even if admission of the [] records were error, those records were merely cumulative and did not deprive [the defendant] of a fair trial.”).

We could conclude Mother waived her arguments, ¶ 101 n.9 (2004), but we choose to address the merits.

We could conclude Father waived his arguments, ¶ 101 n.9 (2004), but we choose to address the merits.

¶ 135 (2004) (citation omitted).

See Muhammad, 253 Ariz. at 381, ¶ 44 ("Where 'a defendant has already been adjudicated competent, the court must be permitted to rely on the record supporting that previous adjudication.'" ( ¶ 48 (2004))); Bishop, 162 Ariz. at 105 (according "some evidentiary weight" to an earlier finding, under "a lesser standard," that the defendant was competent to assist his counsel).

FINK Opinion of the Court appeal.” (allowing review of denial of motion for redetermination of probable cause “when a defendant has had to stand trial on an indictment which the government knew was based partially on perjured, material testimony”).

This is “in contrast to a knee-jerk reflex driven by the autonomic nervous system” or “a bodily movement while unconscious, asleep, under hypnosis, or during an epileptic fit,” Lara, 183 Ariz. at 234–35, or “actually being controlled by something or someone else,” ¶ 200 (2004).

¶ 120 (2004) (explaining that evidentiary objections waived if raised for the first time on appeal); ¶ 41 (2003) (holding challenge to ruling excluding evidence was “waived” because defendant “never presented the trial court with a legal basis for admitting” the exc

P. 31.10(a)(7); ¶ 101 n.9 (2004) (“In Arizona, opening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an appellant’s position on the issues raised.