Cited by

¶ 151 (2004) (improper remarks must influence the jury to be reversible).

See State v. Moody , , ¶ 22, (denial of motion to dismiss charges raisable on appeal but special-action review preferred when motion raises double-jeopardy claim).

DISCUSSION ¶6 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must prove: “(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 22 (App. 2014) ( ¶ 145 (2004)).

¶10 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that ‘(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.’” ¶ 145 (2004) (citation omitted); ¶ 45 (2005).

n.9, ¶ 101 (2004) (claims not raised in an opening brief are waived).

¶11 The Arizona Supreme Court “has long held that a defendant who invited error at trial may not then assign the same as error on appeal.” ¶ 111, (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Indeed, asserting the prosecutor intentionally “crafted” questions “to elicit the exact information” precluded by court order, Taylor contends the court should have “barred a retrial.” ¶11 “Whether double jeopardy bars retrial is a question of law, which we review de novo.” ¶ 18 (2004).

A party is entitled to a jury instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence, ¶ 197 (2004), but a court does not err by refusing to give an instruction that “does not fit the facts of the particular case, or is adequately covered by the other instructions.” (“A trial court is not required t

¶10 “Counsel is given wide latitude in closing argument to comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences from it.” ¶ 180, (internal quotations omitted).

¶25 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that ‘(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.’” ¶ 145, (citation omitted).

¶ 9 (2004) (“Merely mentioning an argument is not enough.”).

Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.’” n.9, ¶ 101 (2004) ().

¶26 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that “(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 145 (2004).

¶ 29, (recognizing that the trial court’s denial of an appointment of an expert is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); ¶ 114, (stating that sanctions imposed for late disclosure “are discretionary decisions left to the trial court”).

n.9, ¶ 101 (2004) (claims not raised in an opening brief are waived).

P. 31.13(c)(l)(vi) (requiring citations to portions of the record l-elied on); n.9 , , 1147 n.9 (2004) (undeveloped arguments waived).

¶ 33 (2008) (harmless error analysis applies to Confrontation Clause violations); 4 IN RE ISMAEL N. Decision of the Court ¶ 132 (2004) (error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if appellate court concludes error did not affect verdict).

.” n.9, ¶ 101 (2004) (citation omitted).

n.9, ¶ 101 (2004) (claims not raised in an opening brief are waived).

We deny relief because “[m]erely mentioning an argument is not enough.” n.9, ¶ 101 (2004).