Cited by

A denial of a motion to sever is reversible “only if the evidence of other crimes would not have been admitted at trial for an evidentiary purpose anyway.” ¶ 38 (2004) (citation omitted).

State v. Aguilar , , ¶ 23, , 872 (2004).

¶ 30 (2004) (emphasis added; citations omitted).5 Applying these 404(c) standards, Hanley has shown no error in the superior court’s admission of the other acts evidence in this case.

Cf. Grubaugh v. Blomo , , ¶ 9, ("When the legislature alters the language of an existing statute, we generally presume it intended to change the existing law."); see also State v. Aguilar , , ¶ 23, ("We interpret court rules according to the principles of statutory construction."); but see State ex rel.

¶11 We review a trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, ¶ 29 (2004), and likewise review a trial court’s decision to withhold a jury instruction

¶ 26 (2004); see also Jurden, 239 Ariz. at 530 ¶ 15 (stating an unambiguous statute is applied as written without resorting to other rules of statutory interpretation).

“We interpret court rules according to the principles of statutory construction.” ¶ 23 (2004).

a jury to reasonably infer that: (1) the other acts were relevant to show “motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident,” and (2) Gehon has “a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the crimes charged, specifically a character trait of aberrant sexual interest in sadomasochistic behaviors.” ¶23 Gehon contends insufficient evidence supported the superior court’s finding that he committed the other acts.

¶ 26 (2004) (“Although a comment may clarify a rule’s ambiguous language, a comment cannot otherwise alter the clear text of a rule.”).

¶12 “We interpret court rules according to the principles of statutory construction.” ¶ 23 (2004).

5 STATE v. BUSTILLOS Decision of the Court ¶15 Generally, “evidence of other bad acts is not admissible to show a defendant’s bad character.” ¶ 9 (2004).

“commission of the other act provides a reasonable basis to infer that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the charged sexual offense,” and (3) “the evidentiary value of proof of the other act is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or other factors mentioned in Rule 403.” ¶ 30 (2004) (citing Ariz. R. Evid.

defendant committed the other act.” , n.1 , , 511 n.1 (2012) (noting “[t]he state must prove *131 that the defendant committed the other act” , as source of heightened standard of proof); ¶¶ 30, 34 , 875 (2004) (citing Terrazas and emphasizing trial court should focus on whether clear and convincing evidence establishes defendant committed other crimes).

§ 13-1420.C (including sexual abuse and molestation of a child), the State “may introduce ‘evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts,’ if the court finds that such evidence ‘provides a reasonable basis to infer that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the crime charged.’” ¶ 24 (2004) (quoting Ariz. R. Evid.

P. 13.4(b); ¶ 38, (“A denial of a motion to sever under Rule 13.4(b) is reversible error only if the evidence of other crimes would not have been admitted at trial for an evidentiary purpose anyway.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

It made specific findings with respect to each factor before admitting L.R.’s testimony, ¶¶ 30-31, and Rule 404(c)(1)(D), and the record supports those findings.

¶ 26, (“a comment may clarify a rule's ambiguous language” but “cannot otherwise alter the clear text of a rule”).

Chronis, 220 Ariz. at 560 ¶ 6, 208 P.3d at 211 ( ¶ 23, 1 Compare Whitman, 232 Ariz. at 68 ¶ 30, 301 P.3d at 234, ¶ 12

Rule 404(c)(1)(C)-(D); ¶ 30