Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Aguilar, 97 P.3d 865.

157 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Brady Whitman Jr. 301 P.3d 226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
“To ascertain that intent, we examine ‘the rule’s context, the language used, the subject matter, the historical background, the effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.’ ” Id.
State v. Yonkman 274 P.3d 1225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State v. Yonkman 274 P.3d 1225 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State v. Vega 262 P.3d 628 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Vega 262 P.3d 628 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
¶ 9 Arizona Rule of Evidence 404 sets forth the principle “that evidence of other bad acts is not admissible to show a defendant’s bad character.” ¶ 9
State v. Lehr 254 P.3d 379 Ariz. 2011
State v. Lehr 254 P.3d 379 Ariz. 2011
“A denial of a motion to sever under Rule 13.4(b) is reversible error only if the evidence of other crimes would not have been admitted at trial for an evidentiary purpose anyway.” ¶ 38, (quotation marks and citations omitted).
State v. Gray 258 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State v. Gray 258 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
In construing § 13-2804, we are mindful that ‘“the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ”
State v. West 250 P.3d 1188 Ariz. 2011
State v. West 250 P.3d 1188 Ariz. 2011
State v. Dixon 250 P.3d 1174 Ariz. 2011
State v. Dixon 250 P.3d 1174 Ariz. 2011
¶ 30, the trial court made specific findings on each of the three Rule 404(c)(1) requirements before admitting the 1985 victim’s testimony.
Preston v. Kindred Hospitals West, L.L.C. 249 P.3d 771 Ariz. 2011
Preston v. Kindred Hospitals West, L.L.C. 249 P.3d 771 Ariz. 2011
¶ 23, (interpreting Ariz. R. Evid.
Jacobsen v. Lindberg 238 P.3d 129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Jacobsen v. Lindberg 238 P.3d 129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
With regard to 404(c), such evidence may be admitted “if relevant to show that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offense charged.” Rule 404(c)
Ezell v. Quon 233 P.3d 645 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
State v. Damper 225 P.3d 1148 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Damper 225 P.3d 1148 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State of Arizona v. Payne Nelson Daniels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State v. Payne 225 P.3d 1131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State v. Payne 225 P.3d 1131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
Under “‘fundamental principles of statutory construction,____the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’” , , see also Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc.
State of Arizona v. Payne Nelson Daniels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
10 the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’” see also Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc.
State v. LEBRUN 213 P.3d 332 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. LEBRUN 213 P.3d 332 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
In particular, he claims that, , the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing at which he could cross-examine the victims.
Chronis v. Steinle 208 P.3d 210 Ariz. 2009
Chronis v. Steinle 208 P.3d 210 Ariz. 2009
To ascertain that intent, we examine “the rule’s context, the language used, the subject matter, the historical background, the effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” ¶ 23
State v. PROVENZINO 212 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. PROVENZINO 212 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
He merely asserts that the language of the statute is “unambiguous in deeming each qualifying prior conviction as a separate aggravating factor.” ¶ 26 , for the proposition that this unambiguous language should be “the guide to interpreting the law.” ¶ 13 The State cites two cases in which the defendant had multiple prior convictions that were treated collectively as one aggravating circumstance —
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ”
In Re the Commitment of Jaramillo 176 P.3d 28 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
In Re the Commitment of Jaramillo 176 P.3d 28 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
See Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, , (admission of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion); , (reviewing admission of prior-act evidence for abuse of discretion).
STATE EX REL. BRANNAN v. Williams 171 P.3d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
STATE EX REL. BRANNAN v. Williams 171 P.3d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶ 26 , (acknowledging language of statute is best and most reliable index of statute’s meaning).
Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra 160 P.3d 695 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Joon Nae Kim v. Mansoori 153 P.3d 1086 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Joon Nae Kim v. Mansoori 153 P.3d 1086 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
If the plain text of the rule is unambiguous, then it “will be given its usual, ordinary meaning unless doing so creates an absurd result.”
Haywood Securities, Inc. v. Ehrlich 149 P.3d 738 Ariz. 2007
Haywood Securities, Inc. v. Ehrlich 149 P.3d 738 Ariz. 2007
“Such unambiguous language will be given its usual, ordinary meaning unless doing so creates an absurd result.” ¶ 23
State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
State v. Grell 135 P.3d 696 Ariz. 2006
State v. Grell 135 P.3d 696 Ariz. 2006
State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 51 ¶ 38, ( ).
State v. Newell 132 P.3d 833 Ariz. 2006