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But voir dire is “not meant to allow a defendant to ‘ask a juror to speculate or precommit on how that juror might vote based on any particular facts.’” ¶ 42 (2007) (quoting United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1207 (10th Cir. 1998)).

¶36 “We review a trial court’s evidentiary decision for an abuse of discretion[.]” ¶ 48 (2007).

¶ 34 (2006) (holding “the trial court clearly complied with Morgan requirements” where “the trial court required each potential juror to fill out a 23-page juror questionnaire that fully addressed Morgan issues” and the “court also conducted individual voir dire of every prospective juror whose responses raised impartiality concerns”); ¶ 43 (2007) (holding the court complied with Morgan where “[t]he jurors 22 STATE V. CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL MONTOYA Opinion of the Court filled out questionnaires, wh

¶ 14 (2007); ¶ 59 (2005) (applying the Sixth Amendment).

¶ 23 (2007) (“Expert testimony that discusses reports and opinions of another is admissible under [Rule 703] if the expert reasonably relied on these matters in reaching his own conclusion.”).

¶ 36 (2005); ¶ 37 (2007).

State v. (Joe C.) Smith, ¶ 48 (2007).

at ¶¶ 21-22; Connor, 215 Ariz. at 561, ¶ 22 — that is, where the denial of access to the evidence fatally infects the trial and renders the proceedings fundamentally unfair, ¶ 54 (2007) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)).

¶172 We review constitutional questions de novo, ¶ 20 (2007), and a trial court’s failure to grant an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 29 (2012).

STATE v. KAVU Decision of the Court forms his own conclusions.” ¶ 36 (2011); ¶ 8 (2012) (“[A] testifying medical examiner may offer an opinion based on an autopsy performed by a non- testifying expert without violating the Confrontation Clause.”); ¶ 23 (2007) (“Expert testimony that discusses reports and opinions of another is admissible under this rule if the expert reasonably relied on these matters in reaching his own conclusion.”).

“We review a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion, giving deference to its determination on relevance, and unfair prejudice.” ¶ 48 (2007) (citations omitted).

" State v. Smith , , 231 ¶ 42, , 541 (2007) (quoting United States v. McVeigh , 153 F.3d 1166 , 1207 (10th Cir. 1998) ).

The court allowed questioning to continue until the juror, when clarifying his answer on the questionnaire, reiterated that if someone kills another he “would not sentence them to death.” “A trial court has discretion to determine the scope of voir dire, which we will not overturn absent an abuse of that discretion.” ¶ 37 (2007).

¶¶ 8–9, ¶ 23, (“Expert testimony that discusses reports and opinions of another is admissible .

¶ 48 (2007) (citations omitted).

See State 43 ¶ 54, (stating that unduly prejudicial rebuttal evidence must be excluded if it would make the proceeding “fundamentally unfair”).

801(c), 802; ¶ 28 (2007); ¶ 45 (App. 2009) (explaining police reports properly excluded as hearsay).2 As a corollary, a witness’s “hearsay 2 ¶ 52 (2006), the State argues that the Confrontation Clause and rules of evidence do not

cannot ‘act as a conduit for another non-testifying expert’s opinion.’” ( ¶ 23, ).

stent with the Confrontation Clause, rely on information in autopsy reports prepared by others as long as he forms his own conclusions.” Dixon, 226 Ariz. at 553, ¶ 36; ¶ 8 (2012) (“[A] testifying medical examiner may offer an opinion based on an autopsy performed by a non-testifying expert without violating the Confrontation Clause.”); ¶ 23 (2007) (“Expert testimony that discusses reports and opinions of another is admissible under this rule if the expert reasonably relied on these matters in re