Cited by

(error non-prejudicial where court sustained defense objection and question was not answered); (no reversible error where jurors promptly instructed to disregard statement after objection).

[were] not evidence.” ¶ 50 (2007) (“Moreover, the jury was instructed that the lawyer’s comments were not evidence, and [this Court will] presume that jurors follow their instructions.”).

necessarily preclude the juror from serving on a jury; if the juror is ‘willing to put aside his opinions and base his decisions solely upon the evidence, he may serve.’” ¶ 19 (2007) ( ¶ 28 (2000)); see also Johnson, 247 Ariz. at 197 ¶ 109 (“[A] prospective juror is not precluded from serving on the jury simply because he favors the death penalty.”).

¶19 “Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury.” ¶ 14 (2007) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1968)).

at 285; McKoy, 494 U.S. at 438–39, 443; ¶ 144 (2015) (holding that jury instructions restricting mitigation to the Lockett/Eddings categories were proper); ¶ 44 (2007) (to same effect); ¶ 72 (2007) (providing that the “so long as” mitigation instruction allowed the jury to consider “all relevant evidence”).

¶ 22 (2007) (permitting the use of one fact to find multiple aggravators).

–07 ¶ 18 (2007) (“A defendant is entitled to ‘a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’” (quoting Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992))).

" State v. Gallardo , , ¶ 34, (alteration in Velazquez ) (quoting State v. Velazquez , , ¶ 45, ).

State v. Velazquez , , 307 ¶ 19, , 98 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Martinez , , 459 ¶ 28, , 803 (2000) ).

to imply unethical conduct on the part of an expert witness in the absence of evidentiary support,” ¶ 48 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), any improper implication of unethical conduct or burden shifting was remedied when the trial court instructed the jurors that it “specifically found that this witness has not violated any code of ethics as set forth in any document.” b. Closing

¶15 A conviction tainted by alleged prosecutorial misconduct will be reversed only “if (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 45 (2007) (alteration in original).

¶ 125 (2009) (noting alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for harmless error) ( ¶ 47 (2007)).

The trial court instructed the jury that counsel’s argument was not evidence and that the officers’ testimony was not to be granted any greater or lesser importance or believability “merely because of the fact that the witness [was] a law enforcement officer.” We presume that the jury followed the instructions, ¶ 50 (2007), and Defendants have presented nothing that negates that presumption.

“We review a trial court’s decision to strike a potential juror for cause for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 13

¶40 “Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury.” ¶ 14

was tied to criminal activity” and that the jury “was invited to similarly speculate he was committing a drug offense in Georgia.” ¶24 Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in admitting the property receipt into evidence, Butler has not shown this “caused prejudice sufficient to constitute fundamental error.”

See, ¶ 20, Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 46 ¶ 41, 116 P.3d at 1206 (allowing defendant to ask potential jurors what “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” meant to them).