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¶145 “We review de novo whether jury instructions adequately state the law.” ¶ 27 (2007).

See id.; (otherwise inadmissible testimony disclosed under Rule 703 may be admitted only for “limited purpose of showing the basis of the expert’s opinion”); -64 (App. 1982) (hearsay evidence admissible when used to form appraiser’s reconstruction of property appraisal); Sim

Even assuming the evidence met the low threshold for relevance, ¶ 51 (2007), the court could have found its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, ¶¶ 35-36 (2003) (affirming the preclusion of third-party culpability evidence when its "tenuous and s

“We review de novo whether jury instructions adequately state the law.” ¶ 27 (2007).

at 285; McKoy, 494 U.S. at 438–39, 443; ¶ 144 (2015) (holding that jury instructions restricting mitigation to the Lockett/Eddings categories were proper); ¶ 44 (2007) (to same effect); ¶ 72 (2007) (providing that the “so long as” mitigation instruction allowed the jury to consider “all relevant evidence”).

“to begin with the assumption that there are premeditated first degree murders that are not cold and calculating and that any evidence of the cold and calculating component would be sufficient to find the aggravator.” ¶90 Although we generally “review de novo whether jury instructions adequately state the law,” ¶ 30 (2010) ( ¶ 27 (2007)), “absent an objection by the defendant, we review for fundamental error,” Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 309–10.

This Court has held that “[t]he (F)(6) aggravator is facially vague but may be remedied with appropriate narrowing instructions.” ¶ 28 (2007).

¶ 58 (2007); ¶ 12 (2006).

Generally, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 30 (2006), but “we cannot require trial judges sua sponte to rule on issues not raised before them.”

Otherwise inadmissible testimony disclosed under this rule may be admitted only “for the limited purpose of showing the basis of the expert’s opinion.” ¶ 58 (2007).

¶33 Even to the extent that the evidence was marginally relevant, see State v. Tucker , , ¶ 51, , 192 (2007) (low threshold for relevance), we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion under Rule 403, see Connor , , ¶ 39, 161 P.3d at 607 .

¶ 31 (2007) (listing Anderson II and subsequent decisions that approved such instructions).

¶ 61 (2007) (“[T]estimony that is not admitted to prove its truth is not hearsay and does not violate the Confrontation Clause.”) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)).

¶7 We review a trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 46, and we review de novo the interpretation of the Arizona Rules of Evidence.

¶¶ 21, 24, (third party’s “mere presence” insufficient to support “grave risk of death” aggravator); Torres, 314 P.3d at 828 (“A child’s mere presence in a home where an offense has occurred does not, standing alone, fulfill the statutory requirement absent some evidence

“Yet, testimony that is not admitted to prove its truth is not hearsay and does not violate the Confrontation Clause.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“The [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”); see also Williams v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2261 (2012) (

¶ 61, (noting “testimony that is not admitted to prove its truth is not hearsay”).