Cited by

¶¶ 69-82, 86 (2008) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of mistrial where jurors had been excused after misapprehending admonition and making incorrect statements of law to other jurors).

51 ¶ 25 (stating that “[a] trial 6 STATE V. RUSHING Opinion of the Court judge ‘must have grounds for ordering restraints and should not simply defer to the prosecutor’s request, a sheriff’s department’s policy, or security personnel’s preference for the use of restraints.’” ( ¶ 119 (2008))); ¶ 30 (2013) (upholding a trial court’s finding of case-specific concerns warranting non-visible restraints at a capital trial where the court had relied on an “individualized security risk assessment” of th

¶ 31 (2008) (“We see no fundamental error.

¶16 Rule 106 does not require the admission of the entirety of a piece of evidence but “only the portion of a statement ‘necessary to qualify, explain or place into context the portion already introduced.’” ¶ 34 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 58 (2008)).

We review the superior court’s decision on courtroom security measures for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 118 (2008), and will uphold such a decision if supported by the record, ¶ 84 (2004).

But as to the third question, ¶ 31 (2008) requires us to review Dobbins’ argument 8 STATE v. DOBBINS Jacobs, J., specially concurring concerning Juror 58 for fundamental error, and there is none here, I concur in affirming Dobbins’ convictions an

See, ¶ 56 (2013) (“Arizona law does not make [the defendant] ineligible for parole.”); ¶ 42 (2008) (“No state law would have prohibited [the defendant’s] release on parole after serving twenty-five years, had he been given a life sentence.”).

See Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 133, ¶ 62 (rejecting fundamental-error claim when the challenged testimony was brief and not relied on in closing argument); ¶ 102 (2008) (finding defendant “failed to show that the snippet of [other-act] testimony rendered his trial fundamentally unfair”).

ount 3 or 5, there was no error because “[w]e have previously rejected the argument that double jeopardy prohibits the use of predicate felonies as ‘capital sentencing aggravators.’” Sanders, 245 Ariz. at 125 ¶ 40 (quoting Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 219); see also Burns, 237 Ariz. at 22–23 ¶¶ 86–88 (confirming “that an element of a crime may also be used as a capital aggravator”); ¶ 130 (2008) (same); Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 219 (to same effect).

-69, ¶ 125 (2008) (citations omitted); see also Ariz. R. Evid.

¶¶ 69-70 (2015); ¶¶ 62-63 (2008)

¶5 This Court affirmed Cruz’s conviction and sentence, ¶ 139 (2008), and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari, Cruz v. Arizona, 555 U.S. 1104 (2009).

¶ 115 (2008) (no coercion when the superior court asked a jury to continue deliberating because it “neither ask[ed] the jury to reach a verdict nor suggest[ed] that any juror should change his or her views”); Roberts, 131 Ariz. at 515.

¶12 “Subject to only a few exceptions, a juror’s out of court statement is not admissible to contradict the verdict.” ¶ 33 (2008) (citations omitted).

–500, ¶¶ 28, 30 (2013) ( ¶¶ 17, 20 (2008)).

¶ 136 (2008) (holding that a jury did not 68 STATE V. RILEY Opinion of the Court abuse its discretion by finding a particular aggravator because the defendant did not contest the evidence supporting the existence of

¶ 33 (2008); Dickens, 187 Ariz. at 16.

We have previously rejected the argument that double jeopardy prohibits the use of predicate felonies as “capital sentencing aggravators.” ¶ 219 (2016) ( ¶ 86 (2015)); ¶ 130 (2008).

" Forde , 233 Ariz. at 553 ¶ 12, 315 P.3d at 1210 (quoting State v. Cruz , , 156 ¶ 13, , 203 (2008) ).