Cited by

403; ¶ 39 (2008) (“Arizona prohibits lay and expert testimony concerning the veracity of a statement by another witness.”).

¶ 32 (2008) (quoting Smith, 215 Ariz. at 229 ¶ 26)).

For a statement to be involuntary, “we must find both coercive police behavior and a causal relation between the coercive behavior and the defendant’s overborne will.” ¶ 44 (2008).

See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313, n.3 (“The right to confrontation may, of course, be waived, including by failure to object to the offending evidence; and States may adopt procedural rules governing the exercise of such objections.”); ¶ 55 (2008) (Although courts review de novo Confrontation Clause challenges, the failure to object at trial means the defendant “must show fundamental error.”); ¶ 7 (App. 2006) (“A ‘hearsay’ objection does not preserve for appellate review a claim that admission

“To find a confession involuntary, we must find both coercive police behavior and a causal relation between the coercive behavior and the defendant’s overborne will.” ¶ 44 (2008).

We review de novo challenges to admissibility based on the Confrontation Clause, ¶ 31 (2008), but review evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 77 (2014), and will affirm the decision if correct for any reason

¶ 62 (2008) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s second request for self-representation after the defendant relinquished such right upon being warned that he would not be allowed to reclaim it); Dunbar, 249 Ariz. at 46 ¶ 17 (holding that the defendant “forfeited his right

¶ 38 (2008); ¶ 1 (2018).

¶42 “Only voluntary statements made to law enforcement officials are admissible at trial,” and a “defendant’s statement is presumed involuntary until the state meets its burden of proving that the statement was freely and voluntarily made and was not the product of coercion.” ¶ 44 (2008).

¶ 44 (2008) (“To find a confession involuntary, we must find both coercive police behavior and a causal relation between the coercive behavior and the defendant’s overborne will.” (citation omitted)).

United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807, 826 (9th Cir. 2019) 3; ¶ 41 (2008) (concluding that officers’ statements during interrogations are not hearsay if admitted to provide context for a defendant’s responses).

We will not find Dann’s statements involuntary unless there was “both coercive police behavior and a causal relation between the coercive behavior and the defendant’s overborne will.” ¶ 44 (2008).

A statement was involuntary if there was (1) “coercive police behavior” and (2) “a causal relation between the coercive behavior and [the] defendant’s overborne will.” ¶ 44 (2008).

Even if timely raised, we will not find statements involuntary unless there is “both coercive police behavior and a causal relation between the coercive behavior and the defendant’s overborne will.” ¶ 44 (2008).

¶ 39 (2008) (“Determining veracity and credibility lies within the province of the jury .

See McKinney I, 245 Ariz. at 227 ¶¶ 7–10 (affirming defendant’s death sentence upon weighing pecuniary gain and especially cruel aggravators against childhood abuse and mental health mitigators); Hargrave, 225 Ariz. at 19 ¶ 86 (affirming defendant’s death sentence involving same three aggravators as Poyson); –342 ¶¶ 73–83, 344 ¶¶ 94–95 (2008) (affirming death sentence in light of same three aggravators weighed against similar mitigation evidence).

“In determining whether a confession is voluntary, we consider whether the defendant’s will was overcome under the totality of the circumstances.” ¶ 44 (2008).

Determining Lauro’s credibility, however, is entirely “within the province of the jury.” ¶ 39 (2008).

¶7 “We review de novo challenges to admissibility based on the Confrontation Clause.” ¶ 31 (2008).

It is well established that “[p]articipation by counsel with a pro se defendant’s express approval is, of course, constitutionally unobjectionable.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182 (1984); ¶ 60 (2008) (citing id.)