Cited by

Ortiz “bears the burden to establish that ‘(1) error exists, (2) the error is fundamental, and (3) the error caused him prejudice.’” ¶ 21 (2009) (citation omitted); ¶ 21 (2018).

e v. West, (affirming especially heinous finding where defendant “told people that he ‘beat the fuck out of some old man’ and bragged about cuts and bruises on his hand coming from beating up ‘the old man he ripped off’”); (explaining the defendant’s post-murder words and actions can evidence his state of mind); ¶ 54 (finding “laughing while talking about cutting off a person’s finger and [being] amused when he told his ex-girlfriend about his actions” were sufficient to establish relishing).

at 447–48 ¶ 38 ( ¶ 21 (cleaned up)).

at 447-48 ¶ 38 ( ¶ 21 (2009)).

Additionally, the jury heard evidence of Jones’s statements to Tess such as, “You’re going to make me hurt you.” ¶ 16 (2009); ¶ 13 (App. 2015).

¶ 22 (2009); (“[A] trial judge’s failure to give an instruction sua sponte provides grounds for reversal only if such failure is fundamental error.”).

to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” ¶ 16 (2009) (citation omitted).

Additionally, while a defendant’s mental state is often challenging to prove, absent an outright admission, it may be properly “ascertained by inference from all relevant surrounding circumstances.” (“Criminal intent, being a state of mind, is shown by circumstantial evidence.”).

[A] [d]efendant’s conduct and comments are evidence of his state of mind.” ¶ 16 (2009) (citation omitted).

See, e.g., Allen, 248 Ariz. at 358 ¶¶ 8–9; Forde, 233 Ariz. at 567–68 ¶¶ 97–98; –72 ¶¶ 32–43 (2009).

[A] [d]efendant’s conduct and comments are evidence of his state of mind.” ¶ 16 (2009) ().

To assess the sufficiency of the evidence in this context, we consider “whether the jury could rationally fail to find the distinguishing element of the greater offense.” ¶ 23 (2009) (citation and quotation omitted).

¶12 Criminal intent is generally shown by circumstantial evidence because it reflects a defendant’s “state of mind,” ¶ 16 (2009) (), and we do not distinguish “between the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence” in ascertaining the defendant’s state of mind, n.1 (1993).

to support a conclusion of [a] defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 16 (2009) (citation omitted).

¶ 22 (2009); ¶ 20 (2005).

Generally, criminal intent is shown by circumstantial evidence because it reflects a defendant’s “state of mind,” ¶ 16 (2009) (), and we do not distinguish “between the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence” in assessing the defendant’s state of mind.

¶ 16 (2009) (“Criminal intent, being a state of mind, is shown by circumstantial evidence.

Defendant’s conduct and comments are evidence of his state of mind.” ¶ 16 (2009) ().

[A] [d]efendant’s conduct and comments are evidence of his state of mind.” ¶ 16 (2009) ().

“We recognize that a trial court is not automatically precluded from instructing on a lesser-included offense because a defendant elects to present an all-or-nothing defense.” ¶ 26 (2009).

¶ 21 (2018); ¶ 21 (2009); –68 ¶¶ 19–20 (2005).

[A] [d]efendant’s conduct and comments are evidence of [her] state of mind.” ¶ 16 (2009) ().

201(b)(2); ¶ 58 (2009) (judicial notice of superior court records).

¶¶ 50–53 (2009) (upholding the finding of heinous or depraved where the defendant cut off the victim’s finger after beating the victim with an aluminum bat, reasoning that the removal of the finger constituted either gratuitous violence or mutilation).