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and suggesting the superior court should consider "if we know the numerical split of the jurors, how long they have been deliberating, and whether or not they have given us any indication about how we could help them."

¶16 Each party is entitled to jury instructions on “any theory of the case reasonably supported by the evidence,” Champagne, 247 Ariz. at 137, ¶ 60 (), but a jury instruction is improper if it misleads the jury, ¶ 37 (2010).

¶54 First, the jury instructions properly and clearly instructed the jury on the legal criteria for imposing a death sentence, including an explanation of what constitutes “mitigating circumstances.” See Allen, 253 Ariz. at 335 ¶ 199 (approving a similar instruction); –87 ¶¶ 53–55 (2010) (same).

–86, ¶¶ 44–50 (2010) (the court’s actions were not coercive when it gave impasse instructions after the jury indicated it had reached an impasse, counsel did not object to the instructions, and the judge did not know the split).

¶11 Although each party is entitled to jury instructions on “any theory of the case reasonably supported by the evidence,” Champagne, 247 Ariz. at 137 ¶ 60 (), a jury instruction is improper if it misleads the jury, ¶ 37 (2010).

Because this Court has approved these instructions, –87 ¶¶ 53–55 (2010), and in light of the jury’s other instructions on mitigation, there was no error.

at 13–14 ¶¶ 57–63 (concluding that proof of entering with intent to commit murder suffices to establish felony murder through burglary and noting it would “be anomalous to conclude that first-degree murder occurs if a burglary with intent to assault results in death but not if the burglary is based on the more culpable intent to murder”); ¶ 23 n.4 (2010) (rejecting argument that “one cannot commit felony murder when one committed burglary in order to commit murder”); ¶ 26 (2012) (“Because Arizon

¶ 13 (2010); see also Bunton, 230 Ariz. at 53, ¶ 9 (affirming trial court's decision "if supported by reasonable evidence").

¶ 55 (2010) (“We presume that the jurors follow instructions.”).

¶33 The jury instruction is facially contradictory because the jury had to consider A.D.’s age to decide whether she was a child.2 But “we will not reverse a conviction unless the instructions, taken as a whole, misled the jurors.” –27 ¶ 35 (2015) ( ¶ 37 (2010)); –77 ¶ 17 (2000) (“[E]rror in a jury instruction is reversible if the instruction, taken as a whole, supports a reasonable presumption that the jurors would be misled.”).

We rejected a –71 ¶¶ 81–87 (2005), –87 ¶¶ 51–56 (2010), and Johnson provides no reason to revisit those decisions.

We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion, bearing in mind “the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate ‘the atmosphere of the trial, the manner in which the objectionable statement was made, and the possible effect it had on the jury and the trial.’” ¶ 18 (2010) ( ¶ 52 (2000), ).

Thus, to the extent the jurors considered the stricken testimony, in contravention of the court’s instruction, (“We presume that the jurors follow instructions.”), it was with the understanding that R.F.’s statement to the officer was wholly unsubstantiated.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings, which is “proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate [] to support a conclusion of [a] defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 24, (quotations and citations omitted).

death, depending on how quickly he lost blood”; and (3) the victim was heard screaming.); (The (F)(6) aggravator was found where defendant stabbed his victim several times and the victim ultimately died by bleeding to death while choking on his own blood.).

¶12 “A defendant has a due process ‘right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent.’” ¶ 13 (2010) (); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992)) (same).

(“Police generally have no duty to seek out and obtain potentially exculpatory evidence.”) (citation omitted); ¶ 24, (appellate court reviews sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether jury’s findings are supported by substantial evidence; that is, evidence that is adequate to support a reasonable person’s conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Henry, 205 Ari

¶ 24, (appellate court reviews sufficiency of evidence by determining whether jury’s findings are supported by substantial evidence; that is, evidence adequate to support a reasonable person’s conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).

(“Police generally have no duty to seek out and obtain potentially exculpatory evidence.”) (citation omitted); ¶ 24, (appellate court reviews sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether jury’s findings are supported by substantial evidence; that is, evidence that is adequate to support a reasonable person’s conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Henry, 205 Ari