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Further, the burden to show presumptive prejudice is “extremely heavy.” ¶ 13 (2014) (citation omitted).

Specifically, “the court may admit out-of-court statements offered to prove the effect on the listener or to provide context for a defendant’s responses.” ¶ 27 (App. 2024) (–64 ¶¶ 73, 78 (2014) (“A text message stating, ‘cops on scene, lay low’ was not hearsay because the message was offered not to show the cops were on scene, but that the declarant was communicating concerns about police activity to someone he thought would share his concerns, suggesting the person’s involvement.”))

Thus, the state may ‘rebut’ mitigation—that is, a conclusion that the defendant should be shown leniency—by introducing evidence of the ‘specific harm caused by the defendant.’” –29 ¶ 47 (2015) (internal citations omitted) ( ¶ 126 (2014)).

¶ 91 (2014); ¶ 78 (2000).

¶ 91 (2014) ("When a jury is properly instructed on the applicable law, the trial court is not required to provide additional instructions that do nothing more than reiterate or enlarge the instructions in defendant's language.").

See, ¶ 86 (2014); ¶ 65 (2009); –41, ¶¶ 49–50 (2003) (collecting cases).

“The publicity must be so unfair, prejudicial, and pervasive that jurors could not decide the case fairly, even if they avow otherwise.” ¶ 13 (2014).

(citations omitted); 564, ¶¶ 73, 78 (2014) (A text message stating, “cops on scene, lay low” was not hearsay because the message was offered not to show the cops were on scene, but that the declarant was communicating concerns about police activity to someone he thought would share his concerns, suggesting the person’s involvement.)

“Although a party is entitled to an instruction on all theories reasonably supported by the evidence, ‘when a jury is properly instructed on the applicable law, the trial court is not required to provide additional instructions that do nothing more than reiterate or enlarge the instructions in defendant’s language.’” ¶ 91 (2014) ().

See Fischer, 219 Ariz. at 416, ¶ 24 (admission of evidence); ¶ 74 (2014) (authentication ruling).

We review de novo challenges to admissibility based on the Confrontation Clause, ¶ 31 (2008), but review evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 77 (2014), and will affirm the decision if correct for any reason

¶ 18 (2014); Yavapai Cnty.

“The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” ¶ 80 (2014) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)).

¶28 ¶ 73 (2014), the defendant objected to the admission of a text message that read: “cops on scene, lay low.” We concluded that the text “was not hearsay because the State did not introduce it to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that the cops were on the scene,” rather the State introduced it “to show that [t

¶ 18 (2014) (citation omitted); (“The granting of a postponement of the trial is a matter within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and .