Cited by

Morgan entitled defense counsel to ask open-ended questions of jurors about what categories of mitigators would be important to them or to ask them to explain what “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” meant); Johnson, 247 Ariz. at 196 ¶ 102 (concluding Morgan did not permit defense counsel to ask prospective jurors what type of evidence they would consider mitigating); ¶ 58 (2014) (rejecting argument that the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel “from asking prospective ju

¶18 We review the denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion, “which we will find only if the defendant demonstrates prejudice,” ¶ 18 (2014), and we consider all the facts and circumstances of the case.

¶ 151 (2014) (“The jury did not abuse its discretion by finding the [pecuniary value] aggravator” where the defendant, convicted of first- degree murder, “planned and participated in the robbery to fund her minuteman operation.

“We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion,” ¶ 18 (2014), but we review de novo Sixth Amendment claims involving a defendant’s right to counsel, ¶ 4 (App. 2007).

–65, ¶ 82 (2014) (“A trial court need not ‘define every phrase or word used in the [jury] instructions, especially when they are used in their ordinary sense and are commonly understood.’”) ().

Crawford v. Washington, 5 STATE v. STUEBE Opinion of the Court 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004); ¶ 80 (2014) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68).

“An illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error.” ¶ 137 (2014).

¶6 Although a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction “on all theories reasonably supported by the evidence, ‘when a jury is properly instructed on the applicable law, the trial court is not required to provide additional instructions that do nothing more than reiterate or enlarge the instructions in defendant’s language.’” ¶ 91 (2014) ().

¶ 8 (2009) (citation omitted); ¶ 146 (2014) (acknowledging that court procedures emanate from court rules and caselaw).

-65, ¶ 82 (2014); (holding that because “theft is a common term which, when invoked as the basis for a burglary conviction, need not be defined [and] .

¶ 18 (2014) (citations omitted).

¶ 77 (2014); ¶ 41 (2003).

We review de novo constitutional claims, ¶ 18 (2013), including the constitutionality of aggravating factors, ¶ 105 (2014).

We review the court’s hearsay decision for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 77 (2014), and affirm if it is correct for any reason

See Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 468 ¶ 210 (“A prosecutor may properly urge the jury to give more weight to a defendant’s crimes than to the mitigation evidence.”); ¶ 47 (2015) ( ¶ 126 (2014)).

¶ 40 (2017) (conjunctive); ¶ 12 (2016) (same); ¶ 12 (2009) (same), ¶ 58 (2014) (disjunctive); ¶ 16 (2014) (same); ¶ 13 (2010) (same); ¶ 21 (2009) (same).