Cited by

See, e.g., Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 220 (stating that the (F)(2) aggravator does not violate the Eighth Amendment); ¶¶ 105–07 (2014) (holding that the “(F)(2) aggravator does not violate the Eighth Amendment” because it “channels and limits the sentencer’s discretion by explicitly identifying which offenses qualify as ‘serious offenses’”).

-65, ¶ 82 (2014) (no fundamental error when court did not define "theft" in felony murder instruction).

§ 13-752(P); ¶ 89 (2014).

¶ 18, (citation omitted).

“An illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error.” ¶ 137 (2014).

We review the denial of a continuance request for an abuse of discretion, “which we will find only if the defendant demonstrates prejudice.” ¶ 18 (2014).

With respect to Jenny S., who identified Goudeau as her assailant after seeing him at a preliminary hearing, P.3d 1200 (2014), is controlling.

Hearsay is defined by Rule 801(c)(1) and (2) as a statement “the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing” that is offered “in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” ¶ 78

Hearsay is defined by Rule 801(c)(1) and (2) as a statement “the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing” that is offered “in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” , 564 ¶ 78

-59, ¶ 42, -16 (2014) (citation omitted).

his right to counsel of choice.” Generally, “[w]e review a trial court’s denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion.”

¶ 18, (citations omitted); (citations omitted).

–65, ¶ 82 (2014) (court did not err in failing to define “theft” in jury instructions because it was used in its ordinary sense and was commonly understood.)

¶ 90, We cite the current version of the applicable statutes because no revisions material to this decision have occurred since the date of the offense.

We review the denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion, “which we will find only if the defendant demonstrates prejudice.” ¶ 18, (internal citations omitted).