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ctor employing suggestive means of identification, including a 5 STATE v. HILL Decision of the Court prosecutor, and the aim of these procedural safeguards is to “deter the state from rigging the identification procedures.” ¶16 Hill’s ¶ 140 (2016).

Although “[p]rosecutors are given ‘wide latitude’ in presenting closing argument to the jury,” ¶ 196 (2016) (), their prerogative to argue their version of the evidence does not sanction a misstatement of law

¶ 192 (2016); ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue on another ground.”).

¶9 To prove reversible error based on prosecutorial misconduct, “a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 193 (2016) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

¶28 “We evaluate each instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct to determine if error occurred and, if so, its effect.” ¶ 192 (2016).

We will reverse for prosecutorial error if “(1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor’s misconduct could have affected the verdict.” ¶ 193 (2016).

¶¶ 203–04 (2016) (prosecutor did not misstate the law by asking jurors to consider facts permitted by the applicable legal standard).

And I would submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, based on the testimony you heard yesterday, this evidence wasn’t messed with.” ¶15 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 193 (2016) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

This Court “review[s] the reliability and fairness of a challenged identification for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 103 (2016).

Substantial evidence is proof “reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of [Twiggs’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 169 (2016).

¶15 We review de novo the court’s denial of a Rule 20 motion, ¶ 168 (2016), and affirm the conviction if substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, ¶ 50 (2012); see Ariz. R. Crim.

¶ 168 (2016); ¶ 5 (2014).

To determine whether an argument constitutes misconduct, we consider the context in which it was made and consider two factors: “(1) whether the prosecutor’s statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 196 (2016) ( ¶ 39 (2012)).

¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2010); ¶ 26 (2016) ( ¶ 11 (2011)).

¶8 We review de novo the denial of a Rule 20 motion, ¶ 168 (2016), upholding the enhancement if substantial evidence supports it, -68, ¶ 52 (2007).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 193 (2016) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

¶7 Proving prosecutorial misconduct is not an easy task; “[t]o prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 193 (2016) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).