Cited by

¶ 184 (2016) (stating that the cruelty aggravator does not require “the victim’s suffering [to] have lasted for any specific length of time”).

¶ 77 (2016) (citing U.S. Const. amend.

sue, and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the 3 STATE v. RODRIGUEZ Decision of the Court other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.” ().

If the comment rises to misconduct, the defendant must show the prosecutor’s misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 193 (2016) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

¶ 59 (2016); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (noting “the evidentiary standard [to determine admissibility] is unrelated to the burden of proof on the substantive issues, .

¶ 199 (2016) (statements and arguments by counsel are not evidence).

To establish a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show “the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 193 (2016) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

State v. Goudeau , , ¶ 132, (quoting Lehr , , ¶ 46, ).

First, this Court has noted that “[c]ollateral estoppel in criminal cases is not favored and is applied sparingly.” ¶ 134 n.8 (2016) (alteration in original) ( ¶ 6 (App. 2000)).

401; ¶ 66 (2016) (“[B]ecause identity was the only disputed issue at trial, the court did not err by finding the other-act evidence relevant.”).3 B. The Superior Court Properly Admitted The Other Acts Evidence Under Rule 404(C).

¶ 47 (2016) (finding no bad faith when the State obtained prior court approval for post-indictment consumption of DNA).

–97 (1993) (finding no misconduct where prosecutor urged jurors “to do justice” if burden of proof was met); ¶ 210 (2016) (finding no misconduct where prosecutor argued that “[w]e are seeking a just punishment for what this defendant has done”); –39, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (“Prosecutorial misconduct ‘is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant im

dmonitions to defense counsel regarding her frequent objections during the State’s closing argument do 9 STATE v. MARQUEZ Decision of the Court not demonstrate bias because “a judge does not display bias or cause prejudice when acting sua sponte to control the courtroom and trial.” ¶ 93 (2016) (internal quotation omitted); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994) (“A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at

¶ 95 (2016) (jury is presumed to follow court’s instructions).

Here, even if the prosecutor’s statements were improper inferences from evidence that would be introduced, see, e.g., State v. 20 ¶¶ 196–98 (2016), they were harmless in light of the trial court’s initial instructions noting that opening statements are not evidence and subsequent admonishment to the jury.

We have previously rejected the argument that double jeopardy prohibits the use of predicate felonies as “capital sentencing aggravators.” ¶ 219 (2016) ( ¶ 86 (2015)); ¶ 130 (2008).

As pointedly noted by the Arizona Supreme Court more than once, a “’defendant may not, in the guise of a third-party culpability defense, simply throw strands of speculation on the wall and see if any of them stick.’” ¶ 165 10 STATE v. PHILLIPS Decision of the Court (2016) (quoting Machado, 226 Ariz. at 284 ¶ 16 n.2).