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ound reason.” ¶33 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ( ).

¶ 90, 281 ¶¶ 97–98 (2017) (concluding misstatement of evidence was not fundamental error as “comment was brief, and the trial court instructed the jury that the lawyers’ closing arguments were not evidence, thereby lessening the impact of the prosecutor’s misstatement”), abrogated on other grounds by Escalante, 2

¶¶ 19–20 (2017), abrogated in part on other grounds by Escalante

–80, ¶¶ 88–89 (2017) (upholding the admission of a detective’s interview transcript to provide context for the defendant’s answers), –41, ¶¶ 15–16 (2018).

-11, ¶¶ 49–52 (2006), ¶¶ 11–15 (2017).

¶27 “Because the jury may consider victims’ statements in making its sentencing decision, the prosecutor may discuss them in his closing argument.” ¶ 132 (2006), see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding a prosecutor may use victim impact statements to argue for death); –92 ¶¶ 108–11 (2018) (holding prosecutor’s recitation of victim impact statement was “not unduly prejudicial and no fundamental error occurred”).

¶35 The Arizona Supreme Court has held that, in assessing whether an objected-to error is harmless, we must determine whether the state has shown “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.” ().

¶ 86 (2017), abrogated on other grounds by Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶15.

To prevail, Daniel “must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make [his] conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 152 (2006) ( ¶ 26 (1998), ).

We review a superior court’s “assessment of the adequacy of disclosure for an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 21 (2006), ¶¶ 13–15 (2017).

f interrogation” and the jury understands they are not intended to prove “the truth of the matters asserted.” Boggs, 218 Ariz. at 334 ¶ 33 (–14 ¶¶ 69–70 (2006), abrogated 12 ).

¶ 12 (2006), ¶¶ 13-14 (2017); ¶ 16 (App. 2012) (“By asking the prosecutor for a race-neutral explanation for the strike, the judge implicitly found that defendant had met his initial burden to make a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.”).

¶ 12 (2006), ¶¶ 13-14 (2017).

¶6 We will not reverse a court’s ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous, ¶ 35 (2017), and we afford great deference to trial court findings in this context, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (“Since the trial judge’s findings in the context under consideration here la

Escalante-Orozco, −86 ¶¶ 117, 126−27 (2017), Rushing, –23 ¶¶ 37, 43 (2017).

osecutor’s argument, this court analyzes whether the remarks called to the jurors’ attention matters that they should not consider, and whether, ‘under the circumstances of the particular case, [the remarks] probably influenced’ the jurors.” ¶ 128 (2006) ( abrogated on other grounds, abrogated on other grounds by Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140 ¶¶ 15–16).

We review the sufficiency of the evidence "only to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, 'viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.'" ¶ 22 (2007) ( ¶ 93 (2006), ).

¶ 36 (2017) (explaining that potential reluctance to impose the death penalty was a race-neutral reason), abrogated on other grounds by Escalante, (determining that prosecutors may strike jurors “who have expressed reservations about capital punishment” ev

5 STATE v. BOTCH Decision of the Court affected the verdict.” ¶ 91 (2017) ( ¶ 40 (2013))

¶11 we addressed Hall’s requirement that a legal determination of intellectual disability be informed by the medical community.