Cited by

onstruction, including examining the rule’s historical background, its spirit and purpose, and the effects and consequences of 6 CHANDLER V. ROOSEVELT Opinion of the Court competing interpretations.” Planned Parenthood Ariz., ¶ 17 (2024) ( ¶ 5 (2014)).

A statute is not ambiguous because parties or courts disagree about its meaning; rather, a statute is ambiguous when, in context, “it can be reasonably read in two ways.” See Planned Parenthood Ariz., -43, ¶ 17 (2024) ( ¶ 5 (2014)).

¶ 13 (2014) (citing cases).

¶32 Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) is identical to the Arizona rule, so authorities interpreting the federal rule are persuasive.3 –93, ¶ 7 (2014).

“We interpret court rules to effect the rule-makers’ intent, using the same principles we apply when interpreting statutes.” ¶ 4 (2014).

owever, “[i]f the statutory language is ambiguous—if ‘it can be reasonably read in two ways’—we may use alternative methods of statutory construction, including examining the rule’s historical background, its spirit and purpose, and the effects and consequences of competing interpretations.” Planned Parenthood Ariz., ¶ 17 (2024) ( ¶ 5 (2014)).

¶ 6 (2014) (concluding Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 “does not bar ‘cold’ experts from offering general, educative testimony to help the trier of fact understand evidence or resolve fact issues.”).

However, “[i]f the statutory language is ambiguous—if ‘it can be reasonably read in two ways’—we may use alternative methods of statutory construction, including examining the rule’s historical background, its spirit and purpose, and the effects and consequences of competing interpretations.” Planned Parenthood Ariz., 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 17 ( ¶ 5 (2014)).

Opinion of the Court language is ambiguous—if ‘it can reasonably be read in two ways’—we may use alternative methods of statutory construction, including examining the rule’s historical background, its spirit and purpose, and the effects and consequences of competing interpretations.” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc., 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 17 ( ¶ 5 (2014)).

¶ 1 (2014) (“‘[C]old’ expert testimony .

¶ 5 (2014); ¶ 23 (2004).

–94, ¶ 13 (2014).5 ¶29 Assuming an expert is qualified, a court’s first inquiry under Rule 702 is relevancy and reliability.

¶ 13 (2014) (noting that the trial court determines whether Rule 702 is met, and appellate courts view that determination for an abuse of discretion).

¶ 22 (App. 2008); ¶ 10 n.1 (2014).

Subject to the limitations of Rule 403, the testimony of a qualified “cold” expert who “educates the trier of fact about general principles but is not tied to the particular facts of the case” is admissible, despite Rule 702(d)’s requirement that the expert must “reliably appl[y] the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” ¶ 21 (2014).

Because Rule 702 is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, “the federal rule’s background and its application by federal courts shed light on the meaning of Arizona’s Rule[.]” ¶ 7 (2014).

State v. Salazar–Mercado, ¶ 13 (2014).

¶ 4 (2014) (“If a rule’s language is plain and unambiguous, we apply it as written without further analysis.”).

“If a rule’s language is plain and unambiguous, we apply it as written without further analysis.” ¶ 4 (2014).

¶ 4 (2014) (“If a rule’s language is plain and unambiguous, we apply it as written without further analysis.”) Despite this, to support his position.