Cited by

Heien, 574 U.S. at 70 (Kagan, J., concurring); ¶ 20 (2019) (applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because “[i]t is unreasonable to require the police to predict a shift in the law when our trial and appellate courts failed to do so”).

has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); ¶ 20 (2019).

“We review de novo the applicability of the good -faith exception.” ¶ 5 (2019).

On appeal, the State now concedes that Young had a reasonable privacy expectation in his laptop but argues there was no constitutional violation because the school employees were not state actors.3 We review the superior court’s order denying the motion to suppress for abuse of discretion and view “the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling.” ¶ 5 (2019) ( ¶ 9 (2016)).

Under the good faith exception, illegally obtained evidence need not be suppressed “when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful.” –70, ¶¶ 6–7 (2019) (quotation omitted) (explaining that exclusionary rule is intended “solely” to deter future violations and that exclusion cannot be justified by deterrence rationale when police act reasonably and in good-faith).

1 Because the superior court’s denials of two suppression motions are the only issues raised on appeal, “[w]e restrict our review to consideration of the facts the trial court heard at the suppression hearing[s],” viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the court’s suppression orders, ¶ 5 (2019).

¶22 “We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion, considering the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling.” ¶ 5 (2019).

¶ 5 (2019) (citation omitted).

¶20 Arizona recognizes the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when law enforcement “objectively, reasonably relie[s] on ‘binding appellate precedent.’”

See State v. Weakland , , ¶ 9, (good-faith exception does not require that binding appellate precedent specifically authorize police practice at issue; objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent suffices).

See Jean, 243 Ariz. at 342-43, ¶¶ 40-47 (finding the good-faith exception applied based on United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and the prior expectation of privacy framework under the Fourth Amendment); ¶ 20 (2019) (applying the good-faith exception because it “is unreasonable to require the police to predict a shift in the law when our trial and appellate courts failed to do so”).

See State v. Weakland , , 69, ¶ 6, , 580 (2019).