Cited by

(Zlaket, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (criticizing any reliance on footnotes while “stating the obvious—that [a footnote] is and was intended to be dicta because holdings do not appear in footnotes”).

Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 1993) (hiring experts); -36 (1996) (calling witnesses).

was not presented on earlier petitions due to counsel’s inadequate representation.”

-37 (1996); Escareno-Meraz, 232 Ariz. at 587, ¶ 4 (“Non-pleading defendants .

¶ 4 (App. 2013); –37 (1996).

ades later based solely on newly discovered mental-health evidence and expert opinions[] seems at odds with [the] interests of finality and victim rights.”); see also Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(10) (“To preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice and due process, a victim of crime has a right” to a “prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction and sentence”); (“If we were to accept defendant’s present arguments, this case and others like it[] would go on indefinitely.”).8

–28 (1996) (rejecting assertion that prior Supreme Court cases had specifically addressed or decided the issue before this Court).

Johnson further argues, citing State v. Mata (Mata II), that it is impossible to craft a formulaic set of narrowing instructions that can sufficiently guide the jury without comparative review.

Simply because a defendant presents the court with evidence for the first time does not make that evidence “newly discovered.” (citation omitted).

prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction and sentence.”) (emphasis added); ¶ 14 (2003) (recognizing victims’ right to finality); (same); (noting in capital case that Rule 32 PCR proceedings are “not designed to afford a second appeal” and that “there must be an end to litigation”).

Noting that Cicogni had “no cognizable claim against prior Rule 32 counsel in [a] proceeding that is not of right,” -37, -53 (1996), the superior court summarily dismissed the notice of post-conviction relief.

-37, -53 (1996); -92 & n.5, -600 & n.5 (1995); -75, -35 (App. 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terr

Similarly, the decision whether to call a particular witness is normally a strategic decision to be made by counsel, and avoiding a so-called “battle of the experts” may, in some cases, constitute sound trial strategy.

Aggravating circumstances “‘play a significant role in channeling the sentencer’s discretion.’” (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)).

Nevertheless, we note that, consistent with the case law establishing a non-pleading defendant does not have the right to effective representation in a post- conviction proceeding, see, Rule 32.4(a) does not include among the timely notices a non-pleading defendant may file, one that correlates to a petition for post-conviction relief.

Section 13-604(W)(4) (Supp. 2007) defines “serious 4 See, n.8, n.8 (1994) (noting that the law of the case doctrine normally “prevents a court from reconsidering issues of law previously decided”), abrogated on other grounds, P.2d 1035 (1996).

-53, -30 (1989) (defendant must show evidence existed at time of trial, defendant exercised diligence in presenting claim, and evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching, but relevant and, if known, would have changed outcome of trial); (“Simply because defendant presents the court with evidence for the first time does not mean that such evidence is ‘newly discovered.’”).

insufficient evidence of gratuitous violence when victim was hit four times by nine gunshots and record did not indicate time between gunshots or order in which they were fired); , (finding gratuitous violence not established when defendant twice drove over unconscious victim with his car)

2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)

(holding F.6 factor, as construed, gives senteneer adequate guidance).