Cited by

¶ 16 (2017) (finding that the DCAC statute seeks “to provide enhanced punishment for offenders who harmed actual—not fictitious—children”); –91 (1990) (“The [L]egislature’s purpose in enacting the Dangerous Crimes Against Children 20 STATE V. HON.

Thus, “[s]ummary dismissal is inappropriate when the petition presents a colorable claim[, which is] one that has the appearance of validity; that is, if the allegations were taken to be true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief.” -72 (App. 1988) (citation omitted), approved but modified in part

The Legislature, however, enacted the DCAC enhancements “to deter and punish those who participate in the child pornography industry.” ¶ 51 (2006); –91 (1990) (“Protecting the children of Arizona and punishing severely those who prey on them certainly are two legislative goals.”).

(“Our ability to interpret a statute’s meaning or rectify statutory infirmities by construing the language to achieve a perceived legislative goal, however, is limited by the constitutionally decreed separation of powers that prohibits this Court 6

14 STATE V. PATEL Opinion of the Court ¶38 In light of the fact that it is fundamentally the province of the legislature to “[d]efin[e] crimes and fix[] penalties,” we are mindful that finding subsection (G) unseverable would necessarily result in finding the entirety of the 2006 amendments to § 28-672 invalid.

We must “strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.” Excell Agent Services, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, ¶ 9 (App. 2008) ().

“[W]e must ‘strive to construe 3 STATE V. GREEN Opinion of the Court a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.’” ¶ 7 (2013) ().

of Pardons & Paroles, (“[O]fficial actions of the [board of pardons and paroles] are not, generally, subject to judicial review.”).1 Arizona courts have “long recognized the division of power and the transfer of jurisdiction over a felon from the judicial to the executive branch of government upon conviction.” ¶ 21 (App. 2011).

§ 13–705; (explaining that the legislature’s purpose in enacting the Dangerous Crimes Against Children Act was to protect children and provide for more severe punishments for crimes against them).

P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii); approved as modified, P.2d 118 (1990)

P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii); approved as modified, (declining to consider ineffective assistance of counsel claim where petitioner failed to specify how superior court erred, denying the superior court “an opportunity to review meritorious issues”); (declining to hear issues not first decided by the superior cour

P. 32.9(c)(1); approved as modified

P. 32.9 (c)(1); approved as modified, P.2d 118 (1990)

modified on other grounds, P.2d 118 (1990); -78, -39 (App. 1991); Ariz. R. Crim.

modified on other grounds, P.2d 118 (1990); -78, -39 (App. 1991); Ariz. R. Crim.

modified on other grounds, P.2d 118 (1990).

2 STATE v. PITTMAN Decision of the Court 485, -68, -28 (App. 1980); Ariz. R. Crim.

“Statutes are presumed constitutional and the burden of proof is on the opponent of the statute to show it infringes upon a constitutional guarantee or violates a constitutional principle.” , see US W. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 23 , (stating that whenever possible, we construe Arizona law “to avoid conflict with the United States Constitution and federal statutes”).

approved as modified, Ariz. R. Crim.

approved as modified, Ariz. R. Crim.

approved as modified by Ariz. R. Crim.

(plain language applies “unless impossible or absurd consequences would result”).

¶ 13, (noting that “courts must accord substantial deference to the legislature and its policy judgments” in analyzing sentencing statutes); (affirming that “statutory language is given its plain meaning unless impossible or absurd consequences would result.”).

¶ 17, (explaining that we apply principles of statutory construction when interpreting court rules).