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The admissibility of evidence under Rule 901 does not depend on a determination that the evidence is in fact authentic, “but only whether evidence exists from which the [factfinder] could reasonably conclude that it is authentic.”

“[The] party asserting that the trial court erred in denying a motion to strike a juror for cause has the burden of establishing that the juror is incapable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict.” (citation omitted).

Authenticity is shown where the proponent makes a sufficient showing “from which the jury could reasonably conclude that [the proffered evidence] is authentic.” (citing cases).

The party challenging empanelment of the juror bears the burden of establishing that the juror is “incapable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict.” ().

When the superior court rules on authentication it “does not determine whether the evidence is authentic, but only whether evidence exists from which the jury could reasonably conclude that it is authentic.”

¶ 21 (2018) (stating rule that a “party asserting that the trial court erred in denying a motion to strike a juror for cause has the burden of establishing that the juror is incapable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict”) ().

Fournier was required to show that the prospective juror was “incapable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict.” (); Ariz. R. Crim.

As the party asserting error, Jimenez bears the burden of establishing Juror 8 was “incapable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict.” ().

See, (upholding a warrant seeking specific items as well as “any and all evidence relating to” a murder).

5 MATTHEWS v. BRIDGE III AZ ONNIX, et al. Decision of the Court ¶18 Authentication is a “condition precedent to admissibility.”

We presume that “any evidence not available on appeal supports the trial court’s actions.”

Romero bears the burden of ensuring the record on appeal is complete, -13 (1982), and “[w]hen the record is not complete, we must assume that any evidence not available on appeal supports the trial court’s actions,”

.” (); ¶ 83 (2015) (concluding cruelty aggravator shown by evidence that victim was conscious and secured to chair, indicating he had “ample time to contemplate his fate”), rev’d on other grounds by Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).

The trial court does not determine the evidence’s authenticity, “but only whether evidence exists from which the jury could reasonably conclude that it is authentic.”

The superior court “does not determine whether the evidence is authentic, but only whether evidence exists from which the jury could reasonably conclude that it is authentic.”

When determining authentication, the superior court “does not determine whether the evidence is authentic, but only whether evidence exists from which the jury could reasonably conclude that it is authentic.”

(“We have held that it is the responsibility of the party objecting to see that the record on appeal contains the material to which exception is taken.”); (“[W]e assume that any evidence not available on appeal supports the trial court’s actions.”).

“When the record is not complete, we must assume that any evidence not available on appeal supports the trial court’s actions.”

See Browne, 834 F.3d at 410; (describing authentication as an “aspect[] of relevancy that [is] a condition precedent to admissibility”).

This standard may be satisfied by circumstantial evidence, and the question for the superior court is not “whether the evidence is authentic, but only whether evidence exists from which the [finder of fact] could reasonably conclude that it is authentic,”