Cited by

Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (citation modified); (holding a defendant waives a speedy violation absent a prompt assertion of the right).

¶¶ 22-23 (1998) (holding a court may not present a defendant with a choice that requires the relinquishment of a constitutional right and any “waiver” elicited from a defendant confronted with such a “constitutionally impermissible” choice is necessarily involuntary); (explaining the “strong interest in the prompt and expeditious handling of criminal trials .

We look at four factors to determine whether a speedy trial violation occurred: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972)

¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue on another ground.”).

(stating that failure to timely object below waives right to raise argument on appeal).

§ 31- 481, Art. III(a); (finding no violation of the IAD’s time limits when continuances were granted for good cause).

(noting that an objection on one ground does not preserve a claim of error on another ground) ( -07 (App. 1991)).

(“It is constitutionally impermissible for a prosecutor or a trial judge to comment on a defendant’s failure to testify .

(criminal defendant entitled to new counsel if “there is a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict between a defendant and his appointed counsel.”); (attorney permitted to withdraw upon showing of good cause).

The comment is improper only if “the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify.” ( ).

(stating that speedy trial violation “is waived unless asserted promptly”).

This limitation “guarantees that a criminal defendant’s due process rights will not be violated,” by subjecting the defendant to “what is, in effect, a second trial on [a] defendant’s prior conviction to establish the existence” of a sentencing 5 Because § 13-604.04 calls for a conclusion about the nature of a prior offense, we distinguish it from sentencing facto

Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 511, 662 P.2d at 1018

§ 13- 703(F)(2)); (reviewing Nevada attempted murder statute to determine if that crime involved violence and holding that sentencing courts “may consider only the statute that the defendant

¶ 7 , the supreme court applied A.R.S.

(“On appeal we will consider a matter not raised below only if it is a matter of fundamental error.”); , (finding that because a defendant failed to raise in the trial court either federal or state constitutional claims that his right to speedy trial was violated, the defendant’s claims were waived absent fundamental error).

-28 , -14 (1991), a direct appeal of a capital case, this court properly analyzed the defendant’s claimed violations of Rule 8.

ial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community); , (excusing jurors who disapprove of capital punishment does not violate Arizona constitutional ban against excusing jurors for their religious convictions), overruled on other grounds, , 64 n. 7, , 1012 n. 7 (1998); , (jurors may be *142 death-qualified even though they do not impose the death penalty).