Cited by

–78 (1991); –97 (1995); ¶ 43 (2019); ¶¶ 11, 14–15, 104 ¶ 16 (2021).

As a result, this court analyzes Williams’ claim under Rule 33.1(g).2 ¶6 Rule 33 “does not define ‘a significant change in the law.’ But plainly a ‘change in the law’ requires some transformative event, a ‘clear break from the past.’” ¶ 15 (2009) (); ¶ 28 (2021); ¶ 13 (2021); cf. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. at 182 (“a significant change in the law” is “a ‘sharp break’ with the past”).

(“[W]e think public policy presently requires that we adopt and apply the federal retroactivity analysis to decisions of state constitutional law.”) ¶11 Any change in the law, whether procedural or substantive, applies to cases on direct review, even if the defendant’s trial has already conclud

¶ 23 (App. 2020); (stating new law applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal).

¶28 A significant change in the law pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g) “requires some transformative event, a clear break from the past.” ¶ 15 (2009) () (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶13 A significant change in the law pursuant to Rule 32.1(g) “requires some transformative event, a clear break from the past.” ¶ 15 (2009) (quotation marks omitted) ().

–82 (1991) (Arizona applies federal retroactivity jurisprudence); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (applying a “new rule” interpreting a criminal statute retroactively).

See, ¶ 15 (2016) (United States Supreme Court's announcement of "a new substantive rule of constitutional law" that was at odds with Arizona's sentencing scheme); -83 (1991) (disapproving longstanding recommended jury instruction).

“But plainly a ‘change in the law’ requires some transformative event, a ‘clear break from the past.’” Id.

onsider whether Poblete is entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(g), which provides relief when there has been a “significant change in the law.” “Rule 32 does not define „a significant change in the law.‟ But plainly a „change in the law‟ requires some transformative event, a „clear break from the past.‟” quoting State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 182

8 B. ¶15 Rule 32 does not define “a significant change in the law.” But plainly a “change in the law” requires some transformative event, a “‘clear break’ from the past.”

disturb[s] vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.” San Carlos Apache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 189.3 As our supreme court stated in Hall v. 3 P.2d 41 (1991), and that line of jurisprudence.

-82 , -49 (1991) (deciding to adopt and to apply federal retroactivity analysis).

(citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320-22 , 107 S.Ct.

14, ¶5 (February 26, 2003); P.2d 41 (1991).

-82, (deciding to adopt and to apply federal retroactivity analysis).

-82 , (deciding to adopt and to apply federal retro-activity analysis).

2 ¶ 5 , our supreme court addressed the question of the retroactivity of a significant change in the law when the issue was raised, following an appeal, in post-conviction proceedings filed pursuant to Rule 32.1(g).

The Arizona Supreme Court observed that its opinion in Hunter is “remarkable” in that it does not indicate whether the fundamental error in that case “had its origins in the constitution.” , 181 n. 8, , 48 n. 8 (1991).

(“When a new principle of law is articulated, a defendant whose conviction has become final may seek relief under Rule 32”).

(adopting federal retroactivity analysis principle that all new procedural rules or principles announced for the conduct of criminal cases generally must be applied retroactively to cases not yet final).

Defendant contends that the portion of the amended sentencing statute allowing for sentence commutation is a