Cited by

(rejecting defendant’s argument that court erred in refusing to sever counts due to danger of unfair prejudice and noting that the fact that the jury acquitted defendant of several counts demonstrated that “the jury followed the judge’s instructions and considered the evidence separately on each charge”).

Two factors are particularly relevant to that inquiry: “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.”

(finding that admitting one erroneous statement did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial "[g]iven the clear quantum of evidence supporting" his conviction); –02 (1993) (finding no fundamental error from a 7 STATE v. DUDLEY Decision of the Court "short remark" about defendant's prior imprisonment when "no one made any further mention of Defendant's criminal record to th

This is especially true when any reference to such evidence was brief and inadvertent, –02 (1993), and the evidence was neither emphasized nor mentioned in closing argument

P. 13.3(a)(1), 13.4(b); –600 (1993) (stating that introducing joined evidence does not result in prejudice if cross-admissible for any evidentiary purpose).

(explaining acquittals on certain charges “demonstrate[s] the jury’s careful and proper consideration of the evidence”); (concluding an acquittal on one charge and a lesser- included offense conviction shows prejudicial evidence “did not so inflame the jury as to ren

(the decision to acquit a defendant of certain charges “demonstrate[s] the jury’s careful and proper consideration of the evidence.”) (citation omitted); ¶ 4 (App. 2009) (explaining that “[the jury], not the appellate court, weighs the evidence and determines

t a motion for mistrial after inadmissible testimony is unexpectedly interjected, the trial court must consider “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” ().

(acquittal of relevant charges weighs against reversible error).

¶25 When jurors found Tejeda guilty of lesser-included offenses on Counts 3 and 6, they necessarily acquitted him of the charged offenses, which weighs against a finding of prejudice because it “demonstrate[s] the jury’s careful and proper consideration of the evidence.”

See Adamson, 136 Ariz. at 262; Kuhs, 223 Ariz. at 387 ¶ 55; –02 (1993) (concluding testimony that defendant had been in prison was not unfairly prejudicial when the remark was brief and not further mentioned).

(noting the jurors’ decision to acquit the defendant of certain charges “demonstrate[d] the jury’s careful and proper consideration of the evidence”); see also Moody, 208 Ariz. at 459, ¶ 145.

(“The broad question posed to [the witness] specifically called for the response now challenged.”); –05 (1979) (holding that defense counsel’s open- ended question on cross-examination had invited error); Wilson, 185 Ariz. at 259.

Although King argues that the detention officer “was a trained officer who knew that he should not reference the invocation,” the Arizona Supreme Court has rejected this argument, finding “an able lawyer conducting cross-examination can usually avoid the injection of known inadmissible testimony by using narrow, leading questions.”

(noting the jurors’ decision to acquit the defendant of certain charges “demonstrate[d] the jury’s careful and proper consideration of the evidence”).

ccasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the 3 STATE v. RODRIGUEZ Decision of the Court other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.” ().

We do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence, (), or reweigh the evidence, (collecting cases).

(acquittal of some charges showed “jury’s careful and proper consideration of the evidence,” thus undermining argument of prejudice from improperly introduced evidence).

Two factors are particularly relevant to that inquiry: “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.”

STATE v. BIEGANSKI Decision of the Court 600 (1993) (noting the jurors’ decision to acquit the defendant of certain charges “demonstrate[d] the jury’s careful and proper consideration of the evidence”).

We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, ¶ 6 (App. 2004), or distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence

(noting the jurors’ decision to acquit the defendant of certain charges “demonstrate[d] the jury’s careful and proper consideration of the evidence”).

(concluding the decision to acquit the defendant of certain charges “demonstrate[d] the jury’s careful and proper consideration of the evidence”); ¶ 33 (2002) (finding evidentiary error harmless and noting, “the jury actually acquitted Defendant of one of the sexua

y exception to Rule 404(b) applies if identity is in issue, “and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.“ (quoting Morris K. Udall, Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence § 84, at 183-84 (3d ed. 1991)).