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We give statutory terms their commonly accepted meaning “unless the legislature has offered its own definition of the words or it appears from the context that a special meaning was intended.” Planned Parenthood Ariz., ¶ 16 (2024) ().

mmonly accepted meanings, ‘unless the legislature has offered its own definition of the words or it appears from the context that a special meaning was intended.’” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. 4 ().

Statutory terms must be given their “commonly accepted meanings, ‘unless the legislature has offered its own definition of the words or it appears from the context that a special meaning was intended.’” Planned Parenthood Ariz., ¶ 16 (2024) ().

Statutory phrases must be interpreted “in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings, ‘unless the legislature has offered its own definition of the words or it appears from the context that a special meaning was intended.’” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Mid Kan.

¶16 Statutory terms must be given effect “in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings, ‘unless the legislature has offered its own definition of the words or it appears from the context that a special meaning was intended.’” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Mid Kan.

§ 13-712(B) to permit presentence incarceration credit solely for time spent in “actual incarceration in a prison or jail.” -37 (1992); (recognizing that A.R.S.

7 STATE v. JONES Opinion of the Court are defined, we apply that definition.”) ().

§ 13–712(B), a defendant is entitled to credit for all time that is “actually spent in custody.” For the purposes of that statute, a defendant is in custody beginning at the time of “actual incarceration in a prison or jail, not simply a restraint on one’s freedom.”

purposes of that statute, a defendant is in custody beginning at the time of “actual incarceration in a prison or jail, not simply a restraint on one’s freedom.” STATE v. GALLENTINE Decision of the Court 690, 691 (App. 1993)

And, “[i]f statutory terms are defined, we apply that definition; otherwise, we interpret statutory terms ‘in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings.’”

§ 13-712(B) (2010), and custody is “equated with incarceration in a jail or prison and not merely with the substantial restraint of freedom which is commensurate with an arrest or detention,” -35, -83 (1992) ( ).

¶ 16 In construing a statute, “[w]e look primarily to the language of the statute itself and give effect to the statutory terms in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings.”

This rule applies “unless the legislature has offered its own definition of the words or it appears from the context that a special meaning was intended.” , (quoting Mid Kansas Fed.

“Arizona court decisions have consistently interpreted the ‘in custody' requirement of this statute to mean actual or constructive control of prison or jail authorities.” , , -16 , -3 (App.1990).

shment purposes, is to be determined by value, prior convictions, and the methodology used to facilitate the offense.” ¶16 When interpreting a statute, we seek “to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” (App. 7 2000); P.2d 681 (1992) (statutory interpretation requires court to discern legislative intent).