Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 437.

90 citing documents.

  • State v. Mayo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • State v. Mayo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    (holding, “absent evidence to the contrary,” an appellate court presumes a trial judge “is capable of focusing on the relevant sentencing factors and setting aside the irrelevant, inflammatory, and emotional factors”).
  • State v. Brice Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • State v. Brice Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    –77 (1995) (upholding consolidation of murder charge with charges of armed robbery and attempted murder of witness whom defendant believed had implicated him in the murder).
  • State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • State of Arizona v. Preston Alton Strong 555 P.3d 537 Ariz. 2024
  • State of Arizona v. Preston Alton Strong 555 P.3d 537 Ariz. 2024
    The protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment’s speedy-trial guarantee “is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been ‘accused’ in the course of that prosecution.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971); (explaining that the right to a speedy trial only attaches after an indictment has been returned).
  • State v. Woodley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Woodley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    haracter; (2) are based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission; or (3) are alleged to have been a part of a common scheme or plan.” “If the offenses fit into one or more of these categories, Rule 13.3(c) authorizes consolidation of separately charged cases in whole or in part ‘provided that the ends of justice will not be defeated thereby.’” ().
  • State v. Scott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Followed State v. Scott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    See State v. 5 Broughton, 156 Ariz. at 397.
  • State v. Wade Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • State v. Wade Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
    (“Evidence which tests, sustains, or impeaches the credibility or character of a witness is generally admissible, even if it refers to a defendant’s prior bad acts.”) (internal quotation omitted).
  • State v. Interval Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Interval Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    (noting that prior acts of aggression were properly admitted because they showed the defendant’s animosity toward the victim).
  • State v. Womble Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Womble Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    “’Evidence which tests, sustains, or impeaches the credibility or character of a witness is generally admissible,’ even if it refers to a defendant’s prior bad acts.” (citation omitted).
  • State v. Cleveland Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Cleveland Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    404(b); (holding “prior bad acts” that “all involved the victim” were “relevant to the victim’s state of mind” and to rebut the defense “of consent on the part of the victim”); (“Evidence which tests, sustains, or impeaches the credibility or character of a witness is generally admissible, even if it refers to a defendant’s prior bad acts.”) (quotations omitted).
  • State v. Moore Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Moore Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971)
  • State v. Valentine Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Valentine Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ("Evidence which tests, sustains, or impeaches the credibility or character of a witness is generally admissible, even if it refers to a defendant's prior bad acts."
  • State v. Younan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Younan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    (“Evidence which tests, sustains, or impeaches the credibility or character of a witness is generally 8 STATE v. YOUNAN Decision of the Court admissible, even if it refers to a defendant’s prior bad acts.”); Je
  • State of Arizona v. Johnathan Ian Burns 344 P.3d 303 Ariz. 2015
  • State of Arizona v. Johnathan Ian Burns 344 P.3d 303 Ariz. 2015
    (“Evidence which tests, sustains, or impeaches the credibility or character of a witness is generally admissible, even if it refers to a defendant’s prior bad acts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • State of Arizona v. Robert Charles Glissendorf 311 P.3d 244 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
  • State of Arizona v. Robert Charles Glissendorf 311 P.3d 244 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
    ctment delay has denied a defendant due process, there must be a showing that the prosecution intentionally delayed proceedings to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass him, and that the defendant has actually been prejudiced by the delay.” accord Lacy, 187 Ariz. at 346, 929 P.2d at 1294
  • State of Arizona v. Edward James Rose 297 P.3d 906 Ariz. 2013
  • State of Arizona v. Edward James Rose 297 P.3d 906 Ariz. 2013
    Such execution impact evidence is not relevant because it is “altogether unrelated to defendant, to his character, or to the circumstance of the offense.” Roque, 213 Ariz. at 222 ¶ 119, 141 P.3d at 397 ( ).
  • State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington 266 P.3d 1057 Ariz. 2011
  • State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington 266 P.3d 1057 Ariz. 2011
    P. 9.3(d); -80, -49 (1995).
  • State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    P. 9.3(d) (allowing prosecutor “presence of one investigator at counsel table”); e.g., State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 483, (detective was Rule 9.3(d) investigator seated at counsel table); (two investigating detectives from different police agencies seated at counsel table).
  • State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
  • State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
    State v. Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 382
  • State v. Garza 163 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2007
  • State v. Garza 163 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2007
  • State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
  • State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
    See, (“Rule 15.1(a)(1) requires the state to disclose the names of all [non-expert] witnesses together with their relevant written or recorded statements,” but does “not require the state to explain how it ‘intends’ to use each of its witnesses.”
  • State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
  • State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
    (noting possible alternative explanations for why a defendant might shoot someone rather than to conceal a crime would go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility).
  • State v. Cleere 109 P.3d 107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
  • State v. Cleere 109 P.3d 107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    See § 13 — 1001(A)(2); , (“A person can, with a culpable state of mind, take an intentional step toward committing first degree murder without exerting or threatening to exert physical force on another person.”); , (wife convicted of attempted murder in murder f
  • State v. Carreon 107 P.3d 900 Ariz. 2005
  • State v. Carreon 107 P.3d 900 Ariz. 2005
    “Without a showing of some impairment at the time of the offense, drug use cannot be a mitigating circumstance of any kind.”
  • Lynn v. Reinstein 68 P.3d 412 Ariz. 2003
  • Lynn v. Reinstein 68 P.3d 412 Ariz. 2003