Cited by

For example, we held that despite an improper warrantless search of the arrested defendant’s belongings while stowed in a police car, because police inevitably would have conducted a proper inventory search of those belongings upon return to the station, the exclusionary rule did not apply to suppress evidence of the

ence during an illegal pat-down where the defendant “would have been arrested on independent grounds and the evidence would inevitably have been discovered during a lawful search incident to that arrest,” ¶ 38 (2004), or where officers searched a car without a warrant and found evidence that would have been discovered during an inventory search

This includes situations in which “a third party with ‘common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected’ voluntarily consents to the search.” (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).

(granting counsel’s motion to withdraw); (granting a continuance).

See State v. (Danny L.) Jones, (“These photographs were relevant to illustrate the medical examiner’s testimony, to show the cause of [the 38 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court victims’] deaths and the similarities of their injuries, and t

We will reverse only if “the defendant shows that the trial court abused its discretion and that the defendant suffered prejudice.”

(noting that mental illness may serve as a mitigating factor only when that illness is causally connected to the crime committed).

(); possible abrogation in part recognized by McKinney, 813 F.3d at 815-18.

“We review a trial court’s decision on the disqualification of counsel for [an] abuse of discretion.” ¶ 23 (2003) ().

(stating that cruelty focuses on the mental anguish or physical abuse inflicted by the defendant on the victim before her death); (holding that murder was especially cruel where victim suffered numerous injuries during a struggle).

“We will reverse the trial court’s decision only when the defendant shows that the trial court abused its discretion and that the defendant suffered prejudice.”

(finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s refusal to strike witness’s testimony or declare a mistrial for alleged violation of the Rule’s parallel criminal procedure rule, Ariz. R. Crim.

Sandretto v. Payson Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., ¶ 8 (App. 2014); (regarding remedy for violation of parallel rule of criminal procedure); United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1251, 1268 (10th Cir. 2011).

1, 567-68, ¶¶ 19-20, -08 (2005); see also State v. Cañez, ¶ 70, (“[W]e will review for fundamental error even absent a pretrial motion to suppress.”), supplemented by P.3d 932 (2003), -03 n.1, ¶ 11, -31 n.1 (2016); (reviewing the admission of evidence for fundamental error despite the failure to raise arguments in a motion to suppress), abrogation on other grounds recognized by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 816-17 (9th Cir. 2015).

See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449–50 (1984) (applying exception after an unlawful confession led police to victim’s body because “volunteer search teams would have resumed the search had [defendant] not earlier led the police to the body and the body inevitably would have been found”); (holding that despite warrantless search of a car, police inevitably would have found contents during subsequent inventory search); (concluding that evidence obtained in illegal pat-down search was adm

2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (applying exception after an unlawful confession led police to victim’s body because “volunteer search teams would have resumed the search had [defendant] not earlier led the police to the body and the body inevitably would have been found”); , (holding that despite warrant-less search of a car, police inevitably would have found contents during subsequent inventory search); , (concluding that evidence obtained in illegal pat-down search was admissible because defend

Police may conduct an inventory search of a vehicle if it is “conducted pursuant to standardized criteria and not because of mere suspicions of criminal activity.” (citation omitted).

Pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally obtained evidence is admissible if “‘the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the illegally seized items or information would have inevitably been seized by lawful means.’”

“We will overturn a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw only if the trial court abused its discretion.”

State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 482

P. 9.3(d) (allowing prosecutor “presence of one investigator at counsel table”); e.g., State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 483, (detective was Rule 9.3(d) investigator seated at counsel table); (two investigating detectives from different police agencies seated at counsel table).