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STATE OF ARIZONA V. EDWARD LITTLETON MCCAULEY Opinion of the Court Mr. McCauley did not know right from wrong to prove the statutory mitigator.” But this Court has described § 13-751(G)(1)’s “capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct” as the capacity to “know[] right from wrong.” See, ¶¶ 100–104 (2013); ¶¶ 73–76 (1998)

See, ¶ 126 (2022); ¶ 21 (2001); ¶ 29 (1998)

and acted with premeditation.” ¶32 “Diagrams are widely accepted to illustrate other evidence and to assist the jury in understanding testimony.”

¶ 45 (2012); ¶¶ 29, 32 (1998) (explaining “[i]t is for the trial court in each instance to exercise sound discretion” to review in-life photographs).

Id.; ¶ 35 (1998) ("Where the law is adequately covered by instructions as a whole, no reversible error has occurred.").

¶ 26 (1998) (determining that a witness’s opinion about another’s truthfulness is admissible if the opinion is not intended to comment on the other’s credibility, is rationally based on the witness’s perception, and could help the jury understand the witness’s testimony or determine a fact in issue).

We will not, however, indulge in such guesswork.” ¶ 18 (1998); (“Unless there are objective indications of jurors’ prejudice, we will not presume its existence.”).

It refers to ‘passivity and nonparticipation’ in the crime.” ¶ 36 (1998) (quoting United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1283–84 (1st Cir. 1991)).

¶ 35 (1998) (“Where the law is adequately covered by instructions as a whole, no reversible error has occurred.”).

¶ 35 (1998) (“Where the law is adequately covered by instructions as a whole, no reversible error has occurred.”).

See id.; ¶ 40 (1998) (“The Sixth Amendment guarantees a fair and impartial jury, but not one having a specific makeup.”).

“Where the law is adequately covered by instructions as a whole, no reversible error has occurred.” ¶ 35 (1998).

We reverse a conviction based on an erroneous jury instruction “only if the instructions, taken together, would have misled the jurors.” ¶ 35 (1998).

helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.’” ¶ 26 (1998) (citing Ariz. R. Evid.

¶ 15 (2016) (explaining that a video may be misleading, but “[s]uch dangers” may be “mitigated by testimony” or “cautionary instructions”); ¶¶ 46–48 (1998) (holding that the State’s maps and diagrams of the crime scene were admissible even if not “absolutely correct,” so long as they allowed the jury “to understand better the statements of the witness” and the inaccuracies 3 The court of appeals recently issued an opinion that the State contends doe

“Where the law is adequately covered by the instructions as a whole, no reversible error has occurred.” ¶ 35 (1998).

This court “will only reverse the superior court’s decision if the jury instructions, taken together, would have misled the jurors.” ¶ 35 (1998).

Instructions inform the jury how to apply the law, and we will not reverse unless the instructions, taken together, would have misled the jurors, ¶ 35 (1998).

("Mere speculation that the jury was confused is insufficient to establish actual jury confusion."); ¶ 18 (1998) (holding when a defendant "merely speculates" that the jury considered an impermissible matter, the court will not "indulge such guesswork.").

When reviewing for fundamental error, “[w]e will not reverse a conviction based on speculation or unsupported inference.” ¶ 13 (2010) (citations omitted); ¶ 18 (1998) (declining to “indulge in [] guesswork” based on the defendant’s speculation that the remarks of two prospective jurors during voir dire tainted the entire panel); ¶ 14 (App. 2006) (holding that the defendant may not rely on speculation unsupported by the record