Cited by

(“[A] trial court’s jury instructions generally should not touch on the subject of punishment except to advise the jury not to consider it.”); –06, ¶ 38 (2000).

¶91 Morgan stands for the proposition that “defendants are entitled to discover through voir dire ‘whether a potential juror will automatically impose the death penalty once guilt is found.’” ¶ 21 (2013) ( ¶ 27 (2000)).

The superior court has discretion in determining whether a mistrial is appropriate, ¶ 6 (2010), and this court will not reverse the denial of a motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion, ¶ 32 (2000).

Further, “the court can dismiss [prospective] jurors based on questionnaire responses, particularly if neither party objects nor seeks further questioning.” State v. Lucas, __ Ariz. __, __, ¶ 28 (App. 2025) ()2; ¶ 24 (2000).

¶33 Prosecutors are given “wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury.”

and not for any other purpose.” “We presume jurors follow the court’s instructions,” and we will not reverse based on “vague references to other unproven crimes” with an appropriate limiting instruction

“Prosecutors have ‘wide latitude’ in presenting their arguments to the jury.” ¶ 51 (2007) ( ¶ 37 (2000)).

Recognizing the superior court “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial,” ¶ 32 (2000), it found that “the jury knows that the defendant was arrested ‘cause they saw it on the video” which was admitted without objection and played for the jury.

at 736; ¶ 27 (2000) (“Morgan recognizes [that] .

¶68 “When unsolicited prejudicial testimony has been admitted, the trial court must decide whether the remarks call attention to information that the jurors would not be justified in considering for their verdict, and whether the jurors in a particular case were influenced by the remarks.”

This discretion is particularly broad, given the trial judge “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32 (2000).

The introduction of otherwise inadmissible other-act evidence does not require reversal if the record discloses no reasonable probability the “evidence materially affected the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 38 (App. 2000); ¶ 32 (2000).

Superior courts have considerable discretion because they are “in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32 (2000).

4 STATE v. THARP Decision of the Court testimony and instruct the jury to disregard it, ¶ 8 (App. 2002); ¶ 34 (2000).

We give great deference to the superior court’s denial of a 4 STATE v. CHAMBERS Decision of the Court mistrial because “[it] is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32 (2000)

We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion because the trial court “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32 (2000).

Trial courts have broad discretion to decide whether a mistrial is appropriate because they are “in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” Arvallo, 232 Ariz. at 201, ¶ 6 ( ¶ 32 (2000)).

¶ 34 (2000) (finding no error where challenged testimony "made relatively vague references" to inadmissible evidence); State v. Lopez, 230 4 STATE v. DINKINS Decision of the Court Ariz. 15, 19-20, ¶¶ 13-17 (App. 2

The court’s discretion in such matters is broad because it “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32 (2000).

¶ 32 (2000) (mistrial); (new trial).

However, prosecutors are given “wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury,” ¶ 37 (2000), including the ability to invoke “criticism of defense theories and tactics .