Cited by

¶ 32 (2000) (mistrial); (new trial).

However, prosecutors are given “wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury,” ¶ 37 (2000), including the ability to invoke “criticism of defense theories and tactics .

¶ 37 (2000); Herrera, 174 Ariz. at 397.

¶ 37 (2000) (“Excessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.”) (internal quotation marks and citation o

Medina, 232 Ariz. at 413 ¶ 111; ¶ 77 (2000).

¶ 37 (2000) (quotation omitted).

¶22 ¶ 79 (2000), to support its argument that “a trial court may also consider lack of remorse for purposes of determining whether the possibility of rehabilitation” exists.

When a witness “unexpectedly volunteers [prejudicial] information, the trial court must decide whether a remedy short of mistrial will cure the error.” ¶ 32 (2000).

We review for an abuse of discretion, recognizing that the superior court “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32 (2000).

However, “[a] defendant’s constitutional rights are implicated only where the prosecutor or trial judge employs coercive or intimidating language or tactics.” United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998) (agreeing that perjury warnings “are not improper per se”); –02, ¶ 21 (2000) (finding that the prosecutor did not threaten a defense witness when he did not contact the witness or his attorney directly and did not say he would pursue perjury charges regardless of how the witness

If a witness unexpectedly volunteers inadmissible evidence, “the trial court must decide whether a remedy short of mistrial will cure the error.” ¶ 32 (2000).

¶ 34 (2000) (recognizing that “testimony about prior bad acts does not necessarily provide grounds for reversal”).