Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Jones, 4 P.3d 345.

278 citing documents.

State v. York Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. York Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
¶ 37 (2000); Herrera, 174 Ariz. at 397.
State v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
¶ 37 (2000) (“Excessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.”) (internal quotation marks and citation o
State v. Tucker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Tucker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Dompkowski Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Dompkowski Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State of Arizona v. Robert Allen Poyson 475 P.3d 293 Ariz. 2020
State of Arizona v. Robert Allen Poyson 475 P.3d 293 Ariz. 2020
Medina, 232 Ariz. at 413 ¶ 111; ¶ 77 (2000).
State v. Fortune Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Fortune Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Madrigal Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Madrigal Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Wylie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Wylie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶ 37 (2000) (quotation omitted).
State v. Torrance Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Torrance Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶22 ¶ 79 (2000), to support its argument that “a trial court may also consider lack of remorse for purposes of determining whether the possibility of rehabilitation” exists.
State v. Hudson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Hudson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Grimes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Grimes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Koch Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Koch Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
When a witness “unexpectedly volunteers [prejudicial] information, the trial court must decide whether a remedy short of mistrial will cure the error.” ¶ 32 (2000).
State v. Barnett Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Barnett Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
We review for an abuse of discretion, recognizing that the superior court “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32 (2000).
State of Arizona v. Thomas Michael Riley Ariz. 2020
State of Arizona v. Thomas Michael Riley Ariz. 2020
State v. Hester Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Hester Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Hand Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Hand Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
However, “[a] defendant’s constitutional rights are implicated only where the prosecutor or trial judge employs coercive or intimidating language or tactics.” United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998) (agreeing that perjury warnings “are not improper per se”); –02, ¶ 21 (2000) (finding that the prosecutor did not threaten a defense witness when he did not contact the witness or his attorney directly and did not say he would pursue perjury charges regardless of how the witness
State v. Keeten Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Keeten Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Frazer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Frazer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Castillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Castillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
If a witness unexpectedly volunteers inadmissible evidence, “the trial court must decide whether a remedy short of mistrial will cure the error.” ¶ 32 (2000).
State v. Kavu Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Kavu Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Wilenchik Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Wilenchik Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
¶ 34 (2000) (recognizing that “testimony about prior bad acts does not necessarily provide grounds for reversal”).
State v. Tracey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Tracey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Phillips Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Phillips Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Norris Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Norris Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 61 (2003) (“[B]ecause the conferences involved entirely procedural matters and [the defendant] has not shown that he was entitled to attend or that he could have contributed to his defense had he been present, we do not find that [defendant]’s right to be present was violated.”); ¶ 51 (2000) (“Although a defendant has the right to be present at trial, his right extends only to those situations in which his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to d