Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Jones, 4 P.3d 345.

278 citing documents.

State v. Suazo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Suazo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Buttita Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Buttita Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 37 (2000) (“[E]xcessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.”) (quoting State v. Gonzales, 105 Ariz.
State v. Samuels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Samuels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
“Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not overturn the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial.” ¶ 32 (2000) (citation omitted).
State of Arizona v. Bryan Wayne Hulsey Ariz. 2018
State of Arizona v. Bryan Wayne Hulsey Ariz. 2018
¶109 Statements are improper if they (1) “call to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) [there is a high] probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 37 (2000) (citing Hansen, 156 Ariz. at 296–97).
State v. Mainez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Mainez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Issa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Issa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Griego Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Griego Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 51 (2007) ( ¶ 37 (2000), and Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 85, ¶ 59).
State v. Eaton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Eaton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Nichols Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Nichols Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Generally, “prosecutors have wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury: excessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.” ¶ 37 (2000) (citation omitted).
State v. Billups Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Henderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Henderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 32 (2000); ¶ 47 (App. 2004).
State v. Billups Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
We give great deference to the trial court’s decision because that court “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32
State v. Stoneham Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Stoneham Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶10 Prosecutors are given wide latitude during closing arguments to the jury because “excessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed for the jury.” ¶ 37 (2000) (citation and quotation omitted).
State v. Silva Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Silva Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Russell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Russell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶ 37, (citation omitted).
State v. Begay Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Begay Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
ou when he took the stand.” ¶12 To determine whether a prosecutor’s remarks are improper, we consider “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 37 (2000) (citation omitted).
State v. Gurrieri Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Gurrieri Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. McDowell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. McDowell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Boudreau Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Boudreau Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Peterson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Peterson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Wilson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Clary Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Clary Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 43, (concluding that the prosecutor’s remark asking the jury to find the defendant “guilty on behalf of those people and their families and the people of the State of Arizona” was not an attempt to inflame the jury and did not rise to the level of misconduct).
State v. Wilson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Prosecutors have “wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury.” Ramos, at ¶ 22 ( ¶ 37 (2000)).
State v. Jones Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Jones Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 37 (2000) (-97 (1988)).
State v. Acosta Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Acosta Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016