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“When the witness unexpectedly volunteers information, the trial court must decide whether a remedy short of mistrial will cure the error.” ¶ 32, (emphasis and citation omitted).

¶ 32, (reviewing superior court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion).

¶8 “Arizona has long recognized that testimony about prior bad acts does not necessarily provide grounds for reversal.” ¶ 34 (2000).

4) (“[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations”); Benson, 232 Ariz. at 463, ¶¶ 42–44, 307 P.3d at 30 (concluding that when viewed in context, the prosecutor did not misstate the law); ¶ 37, (Prosecutors have considerable latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury.).

¶¶ 5–7, (interpreting 2001 version of statute); –39 ¶¶ 56–57, – 60 (2002); State v. (Robert G.) Jones, ¶ 64, n.2, n.2 (1983); –11, –36 (1981).

8 STATE v. ABBOTT Decision of the Court ¶26 “[P]rosecutors have wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury[.]” ¶ 37 (2000).

We give the trial court “great deference” because it “is in the best position to determine whether the [alleged error] will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 40, ( ¶ 32, ).

¶ 37, (“[E]xcessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.”).

¶58 “When unsolicited prejudicial testimony has been admitted, the trial court must decide whether the remarks call attention to information that the jurors would not be justified in considering for their verdict, and whether the jurors in a particular case were influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 32

¶29 Recchia next argues that the prosecutor improperly impugned defense counsel by calling him “juvenile” and by stating that counsel was leading jurors astray or “down the garden path.” Prosecutors are allowed “wide latitude” during closing arguments, ¶ 37, although it is improper to impugn the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel.

¶¶ 32, 34, (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mistrial for a witness’s “relatively vague references to other unproven crimes and incarcerations”).

Prosecutors are afforded “wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury.” ¶ 37

¶ 32, (stating that trial court’s denial of motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); (stating that denial of motion for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

“The trial judge’s discretion is broad because he is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32, (internal citation omitted).

In determining whether to grant a mistrial, the trial court considers “whether the remarks call attention to information that the jurors would not be justified in considering for their verdict, and whether the jurors in a particular case were influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 32

¶5 “[P]rosecutors have wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury: ‘excessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel's forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.’” ¶ 37, (citation omitted).

In determining whether a prosecutor’s remarks were improper, we consider factors including “(1) whether the remarks call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 37, (citation omitted).

¶ 37, (“[P]rosecutors have wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury.”).