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We give “great deference” to a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a mistrial because the trial court is in “the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 40, ( ¶ 32, ).

“[E]xcessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.” ¶ 37, ( ).

“Excessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.” ¶ 37

¶38 A juror is properly excused for cause “if the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.’” State v. (Robert G.) Jones, ¶ 24, (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)); see Ariz. R. Crim.

We give great deference to the trial court’s decision because the trial court “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 32

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to strike a potential juror for cause for abuse of discretion, ¶ 24, because trial judges are in the best position to “assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it,” Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9, 20 (2007).

¶21 In Morgan v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court held that defendants are entitled to discover through voir dire “whether a potential juror will automatically impose the death penalty once guilt is found.” ¶ 27, (discussing Morgan).

at 238, 244 ¶¶ 10, 37, 25 P.3d at 726, 732; ¶ 10, 1 ¶4 At Nordstrom’s trial, eyewitness Carla Whitlock identified Nordstrom as one of the men she saw run from the 1 A jury found Jones guilty on six co

Or, the publicity must be so outrageous that it turned the trial into a “mockery of justice or a mere formality.”

“Evidentiary rulings are subject to the trial court’s determination and will not be disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 47

Morgan’s holding, however, is considerably narrower: “[D]efendants have a right to know whether a potential juror will automatically impose the death penalty once guilt is found, regardless of the law,” and “[t]hus, defendants are entitled to address that issue during voir dire.” ¶ 27, (construing Morgan).