Cited by

See id.; (unless legislature demonstrates intent to limit scope of general words by placing 4 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court them with a list of similar things, general words must be given their usual and common

¶ 11 (2003) (noting that we apply the plain meaning of a statute “unless [it] would lead to impossible or absurd results”).

reditor’s rights against the transferee or the transferred asset”); see also Farris, (transferee was defendant in underlying avoidance action); ¶¶ 32-33 (App. 2003) (husband’s mistress was defendant in fraudulent-transfer action brought by wife seeking to avoid transfers from husband to mistress)

¶ 11 (2003) (“The court must give effect to each word of the statute.”).

Appellees’ “alleged good faith is immaterial.” ¶ 37 (App. 2003), ¶ 28 (2003).

¶ 8 (App. 2006) ( ¶ 11 (2003)).

Although the APSA creates "broad protective provisions," Delgado v. Manor Care of Tucson AZ, LLC, ¶ 16 (2017), we cannot ignore the statute's express requirements, ¶ 11 (2003) ("The court must give effect to each word of the statute."); Canon Sch.

See City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., –47 ¶ 30 (2017) (“[E]jusdem generis applies ‘where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things.’” ( ¶ 13 (2003))); see also Williams v. Pipe Trades Indus.

ding appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review post-summary judgment order denying a motion for new trial because the summary judgment order was not final); ¶ 26 (App. 2003) (“A party may not create access to appellate review merely by filing a new trial motion from a non-appealable interlocutory order.”)

We “assign to the language its ‘usual and commonly understood meaning.’” -65, ¶ 11 (2003) (citation omitted).

“If the language is plain, we need look no further[,]” and we apply it “unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results.” ¶ 11 (2003).

We also apply secondary principles of construction if “application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results.” ¶ 11 (2003).

" Bilke v. State , , 464-65 ¶ 11, , 271-72 (2003) (citation omitted).

“In giving effect to every word or phrase, the court must assign to the language its ‘usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.’” -65 ¶ 11 (2003) (citation omitted).

Ctr., and when possible, we will give the statute its plain and obvious meaning, ¶ 11 (2003).

¶ 11 (2003) (stating that in construing a statute, we look to the plain language of the statute, giving effect to every word and phrase, and assigning to each word its plain and common meaning).

In doing so, we first consider the language of the statute, State v. Derello , , ¶ 21, giving "every word and phrase its 'usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning,' " State v. Randles , , ¶ 8, (quoting Bilke v. State , , ¶ 11, ); see also State v. Pena , , ¶ 6, (we may look to dictionaries for common meanings).

§ 8-538(A), and render Rule 66(F)(2)(a) meaningless, see Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 20 (2018) (“We will not interpret statutes or rules in a manner that renders portions of their text superfluous.”) ( ¶ 11 (2003)); ¶ 20 (App. 2013) (“We will not rewrite statutes to effectuate a meaning different than the one the legislature intended.”).

See *1129 Bilke v. State , , ¶ 11, (we apply the plain meaning of a statute "unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results"); cf. § 13-4314(A) (state's application for forfeiture includes "notice and facts sufficient to demonstrate probable cause for forfeiture"); Ariz. R. Sup.